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# *Journal of Comparative Literature & Aesthetics*

VOLUMES II - III

1979-80

*Felicitating the 77th Birthday of Dr. Subodh Chandra Sengupta,  
Emeritus Professor of English, Jadavpur University and  
India's celebrated Shakespearian Scholar and  
Comparative Aesthetician*

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PROFESSOR S. C. SENGUPTA  
BORN 27TH JANUARY, 1903

2/4 Ekdalia Road, Calcutta-700019

20 November, 1979

My dear Sukla.

You want a brief account of my life and work for the next issue of your journal.

I was born on 27th January 1903 and had a severe cardiac attack in October 1973, from which I have not recovered and never shall. No wonder that at my age and in my situation, everything, particularly my own work, seems to be unreal, and yet everything, the affection of my pupils, for example, seems to have value. So I embark on this autobiographical venture gladly but not without a sense of embarrassment.

The first thing that strikes me is that I am old-fashioned in my tastes, studies and attitudes. Reviewing my first English book, *The Art of Bernard Shaw 1936*, *The London Mercury* ended a commendatory note with the rider that it was 'somewhat lacking in contemporaneity.' About three decades after, when I published *Shakespeare's Historical Plays* (1964), a continental journal—I forget the name just now—wrote deprecatingly that criticism such as mine was 'anaemic' but added a consolatory tag that the book nevertheless appeared to the reviewer to possess 'an old fashion charm.' Was I born like Sir John Falstaff 'with a white head and something of a round belly'? Or, was it a part of my training? Professor P. C. Ghose, my most distinguished teacher, who was a master of many languages and literatures, used to say with visible pride, 'when I see a new book, I read an old one'!

My first teacher was my father, a lover of English, who regarded writing good English as the noblest aim of life and praise of one's English style as the most covetable distinction. By 'good English' he did not mean gaudiness or verbosity, but a happy turn of phrasing, common things felicitously expressed. He would in his own modest way value expression more than idea, put form above content. So whenever he met with a beautiful sentence in a book or even in a newspaper,

he would write it out somewhere, on margins of books, on doors and walls, on any other thing that might seem handy. So any one entering any room in our thatched village house would at first be bewildered by an array of detached sentences which none but my father could decipher. But even while I was under his tutelage, I had moments of doubt about what was primary or more valuable : the meaning or the expression.

It was in this state of mind that in 1920 I entered Presidency College, Calcutta, then the most important seat of learning in Bengal, might be in the whole of India. Here I felt that I was under wider horizons, could browse amongst books in a magnificent library that had been making its collections for more than a century, and I also came in touch with teachers who were not only eminent scholars but men with original insights, who approached literature, each in his distinctive way. I would first mention J. W. Holme, whose introduction to *As You Like It* in the (Old) Arden Shakespeare is a standard piece of criticism. My contact with Holme was brief, because largely on account of political agitation, an Englishman had by then become somewhat of a misfit in an Indian college, and Holme was, I believe, an aloof and detached sort of man who left as soon as he sensed the wind of change. An 'unfledged' teenager, I could not get out of him all that he had to give me. Yet I retain even today vivid impressions of his lectures and more pointedly, of his comments on my essays. Taking a common sense view of literature, he was very hard on padding, on decoration and overemphasis. He frowned whenever he saw the adverb 'very', and the use of 'very' as an adjective he looked upon as a culpable offence. He wanted us to think clearly and to express ourselves concisely and with precision, never allowing us to use a word too many. A year's work with him cured me of my inherited love for beauty of expression as an end in itself. I have heard that at Liverpool, where he was a pupil of Oliver Elton, he had specialized in Spenser, but his attitude to literature was un-romantic and un-mystical. Although I treasure my association with this teacher, I felt even then that there are heights and depths in poetry which one cannot reach along the path of common sense.

At the opposite extreme stood another teacher— Srikumar Banerjee, author of *Critical Theories and Poetic Practice in 'The Lyrical Ballads'*, who taught romantic poetry with distinction, analysing its subtlest filaments in the poems of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley and Keats and contrasting their depth and subtlety with the more pedestrian and meretricious features of the poetry of Byron and Swinburne. This, you might say, is old-fashioned now, but I want to put on record that



intimate contact with this teacher, which lasted till his death in 1970, made me eager to probe the deeper meaning of poetry. I was drawn to his lectures and later to his writings because although he attempted interpretation and exegesis, his mind was as creative as critical. In the terminology of Indian poetics, he was a true *Sahṛdaya* ('like-minded'); his mind was like a transparent mirror on which the poet's imagination was clearly reflected. Even so I felt that he stopped short somewhere; he would analyse the product of the imagination rather than the imagination itself.

Greater than J. W. Holme or S. K. Benerjee was Professor P. C. Ghosh, a vastly learned man, a polymath with the voice of an angel. In his lectures Chaucer and Shakespeare were so wonderfully re-created that I wished these poets had been my class-fellows and felt the full impact of their poetry. His lectures on Shakespeare particularly were an overwhelming experience for all his pupils, not merely for those who like me have dabbled in literature. It was a part of P. C. Ghosh's greatness as well as his weakness that he was absorbed in the concrete and never bothered about generalities. Nobody could analyse and interpret Hamlet, Iago, Bottom or Shylock in greater detail or re-create fourteenth century England as reflected in Chaucer's poetry better than he, but if he were asked to dwell on Shakespearian tragedy or Chaucer's humour, he would have fumbled, because he did not look at literature in that way at all.

If in my old age, I could be a little irreverent about people whom I adored then and whose memory I cherish now, I felt a certain 'indolence about fundamentals' in their attitude to and interpretation of literature. S. K. Banerjee considered my inquiry into the problem of meaning an obsession. All poems, except *Kubla Khan*, which was composed in a dream, have a meaning, he said. That is all that we need to know. But why do then people bother, I wondered, about the meaning of *Kubla Khan*, too? And if *Kubla Khan*, which had no meaning, could be great poetry, why bother about the meaning of other poems? Rather should we not discover that intangible essence which, independently of meaning, makes *Kubla Khan* great poetry? J. W. Holme, I still remember vividly, said once that he would not care to undertake a definition of romanticism. All that he might say would be that certain lines are indubitably romantic, and he rehearsed:

The same that oft-times hath  
Charm'd magic casements, opening on the foam  
Of perilous seas, in faery lands forlorn.

P. C. Ghosh was so absorbed in exploring meanings and so lustily jeered at those



who fought shy of them that I thought questioning him about their relevancy would be an impertinence.

In Calcutta University, the full degree course in my time covered four years (two years for B. A. followed by two years for M. A.). As I proceeded to take the second part of the course, I met in the University a teacher very different from the three I have described above. He was K. C. Mukherji, who after a triple Honours (English, Sanskrit and Philosophy) and M. A. (English) in Calcutta, went to London where he took a degree in English and then proceeded to Oxford where he read Greek and had the distinction of becoming a John Locke Scholar. For some time he also taught Neo-Platonism at Oxford and then returned in the early twenties to practice as a barrister at the Calcutta High Court. His chief distinction from the teachers I have named above was that he was an unsuccessful lecturer, or I might say, that he did not lecture at all. He used to examine our essays which he would riddle with strictures and ask us questions which he himself would not care to answer. But the questions themselves were very illuminating. While other teachers trod the primrose path to beauty, he would take us to the roughhewn world of aesthetics — the thorny problems of form and content, meaning and expression, the justification for literary kinds and the relationship between life and literature. He was supposed to teach Aristotle, but more importantly, he introduced me to Croce, and when later on, I asked him guidelines for a dissertation on Bernard Shaw, he asked me to read Plato — not once or twice, but fifty times ! One thing is certain. In 1924 he set me problems which have kept me occupied for the last fiftyfive years.

The first considerable work I undertook in English was, as I have said, on Shaw whom I selected because here I would have to grapple with the problem of meaning. As is well known, claiming an apostolic succession from Aeschylus to himself. Shaw said that he wrote his plays to convert the world to his opinions and that for the sake of art alone he would not face the toil of writing a single line. Nevertheless, his work has been recognized as great art, and he knew it ; otherwise he would have claimed succession from Saint Peter rather than from Aeschylus. Shaw rejected Shakespeare's ideas but admitted that there could not be a more consummate dramatist than Shakespeare. This ambivalence is noticeable in every sphere of literature — amongst great artists, critics and ordinary readers. In a professedly autobiographical epistle, I make no apology for constantly referring to my own books. Accepting the advice of Frederick Page, then Reader to the Oxford University Press and later Editor of *Notes and Queries*, I named my Shaw book *The Art of Bernard Shaw*, but the reviewer of the *Times Literary Supplement*, who liked it, said that 'Shaw the Philosopher-Artist' would have been a more appropriate title.

My five books on Shakespeare must have been deeply influenced by the interpretations of Professor P.C. Ghosh who showed to us how in the plays every scene, every speech, nay, every word was palpitated with life. But I have also wandered into paths he would never care to tread. Not only have I accepted the general principle of the Folio classification but also elaborated in my own way what, in my opinion, are the characteristics of Shakespearian Comedy, Shakespeare's Histories, and via Bradley, Shakespearian Tragedy. I have returned to the theory of literary kinds in *A Shakespeare Manual* (1977), in which, among other things, I have tried to draw the line of distinction between tragedy and comedy and pastoral romance. I have also tried to reconstruct Shakespearian characters in their totality—this was implicit in the Master's teaching—and their movement and development through the plot. I admit this is old-fashioned criticism, and I guess only old-fashioned people have liked it. Incidentally, here I have in a large measure departed from Croce who laughs away the theory of literary kinds, saying that the comic, tragic etc. 'is *everything* that is or shall be so *called* by those who have employed or shall employ these *words*'.

One day when P.C. Ghosh was reading *Othello* with us (1923), one of my friends, a brilliant man, asked him when exactly Othello became jealous in the modern conventional acceptance of the term. The Professor stopped and the lecture ended there on that day. I wonder if he pondered the matter again. To him a Shakespeare play was a seamless unity and he would occasionally refer to the old texts, particularly the Folio, in support of his belief that even the scene-and-act divisions were a later theatrical addition. \* To him my friend's question must have seemed to be irrelevant. But to me it occurred off and on. The Double Time Theory developed by Christopher North did not appeal to me, for I thought it to be undramatic. And Danile's Time-Analysis, in spite of all his ingenuity, seemed to me to be somewhat mechanical. About forty years after my friend's question, I enunciated a theory about Duration in Shakespeare's plays in my book *The Whirligig of Time* (1961). I confess it has not found favour with readers and critics. So I can only quote Touchstone and say, '...an ill favoured thing, sir, but mine own : a poor humour of mine, sir, to take that no man else will.'

My teachers laid emphasis on the meaning of poetry and the intensity of emotion and expression that characterises it, but only K.C. Mukherji faced the problem whether meaning could be seen in isolation from expression. Croce, who defines aesthetic as the science of expression, would not concede that poetry has any content, neither can there be in his view any intensity in poetry, for as soon

as our vague impressions are expressed, poetry is complete and there can be no degree of completeness. A wag might ask, 'Why then do we hunt Roget's *Thesaurus* for the most appropriate words for the ideas clamouring for expression in our minds?' Walter Pater, while reducing the content of art and poetry to nothingness, nevertheless accepts *quality*, burning with a hard gem-like flame as the criterion of beauty in life and art, but another name for this quality is intensity of thought, emotion and expression. T. S. Eliot, who has nothing else in common with Pater or Croce, is also of the opinion that meaning is indifferent to poetry; it is like the piece of meat given by the burglar to the dog, for it keeps the mind engaged while poetry, which consists in the intensity of the fusion of ideas, feelings etc., does its work stealthily. I was attracted to Eliot but as, to my mind, he has nowhere clearly explained what he means by this intensity of fusion, he could not hold me in thrall for long. Pater, who is one of the finest critics of literature, aspired to bring content under the domination of form, but when he made a distinction between great art and good art on the basis of subject or content, he received back by one door what he had driven out by another. A philosopher by profession, Croce is more cautious in drawing conclusions and more thorough-going than most literary critics in his analysis, but he, too, gives away half his case when he says that the difference between one work of art and another is one of extension, that is to say, the larger the area or subject-matter, the greater the work of art. No wonder his practical criticism, intended to illustrate his theories, not unoften also modifies them.

The quest of meaning or the uneasy co-existence of content and form took me somewhat late in life to the intricacies of Indian poetics. My attention was drawn to this subject by the fascinating exposition of *rasa* and *dhvani*<sup>1</sup> given by the eminent Bengali philosopher-critic Atulchandra Gupta, a true spiritual descendant of the eleventh century Kashmirian exponent of this theory — the great Abhinava Gupta. Here, too, I reacted against my guide for while Atulchandra Gupta emphasized the transcendental quality of *rasa*, its independence of earthly concerns and made no secret of his aversion for detailed analysis, criticism and judgement, I could never get away from my pre-occupation with meaning and my innate conviction that this meaning or content is an organic component of the work of art, and even if *rasa* soars to transcendental (*alaukika*) regions, it has its feet firmly planted on the earth. These problems have haunted me all my life; I have stated them as clearly as I could and also tried to answer them in *Towards A Theory of the Imagination* (1959) and in several Bengali books. It is from this point of view, again that I have interpreted 'imitation',

poetic 'universality', 'Thought' as a constituent of Tragedy, in my *Introduction to Aristotle's Poetics* (1971).

I started with a reference to reviews of two books of mine — one written early in life, the other during what may be called the late middle period, because I have written several books after it. I shall conclude by adapting words used by *Shakespeare Survey* in its review of one of my latest books, *Aspects of Shakespearean Tragedy* (1972). A persistent concern with the relationship between ideas and expression and between reality and forms of imaginative truth probably give a tenuous unity to my adventures in the field of aesthetic theory and practical criticism.

Yours Sincerely  
S. C. Sengupta

Dr. A. C. Sukla  
Sambalpur  
Orissa

\* His partiality for the Folio and the "good Quartos" is reflected in my essay on the Textual Problem in *A Shakespeare Manual* (1977). 1. An inadequate English synonym for 'rasa' would be 'taste'; some critics call it 'flavour'. 'Dhvani' is untranslatable; it means the secondary meaning that emerges out of the primary dictionary meaning which it sometimes contradicts.



## PLATO'S USE OF POETRY \*

JOHN FISHER

Plato is remembered for his intemperate, strident attack on the poets in *Republic X*. He is remembered for his not thoroughly convincing charge that poets, on the whole, have a destructive effect upon society because of their concern only with appearances, because of their commitment to the deliberate production of emotional states, and because of their deceit, their lies about the gods. What is much less frequently noticed about this castigator of the poets is that, far more than any philosopher of his time, and probably of all time, Plato *uses* the poets, that is, uses their poems and fragments of poems repeatedly in the development and articulation of his own ideas in the dialogues. These uses range over a wide spectrum of functions. What follows here is an account, inexhaustive, but I think fair to the facts, of how and why Plato can and does use the Greek poets, particularly Homer, in his expositions and arguments.

To understand Plato's use of poetry calls for an understanding of the general notion of "use". The ordinary synonyms, such as "employment" are of little exploratory or explanatory value, nor are the occasions when authors have found the term convenient to suggest such relationships as "learning from," as in Herbert Muller's *The Uses of the Past*, or "analysing so that our assessments shall be logically satisfactory," as in Stephen Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument*, or in Nietzsche's celebrated essay, *The Use and Abuse of History*, where, if we take the German title, *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben*, seriously, use (perhaps not a felicitous choice by the translator) means something like "benefits" or "advantages". Inevitably, of course, the term does connote consequences, usually advantageous or profitable, but how the term functions remains to be explored.

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If use is closely related to the concept of utility, as it surely seems to be — indeed romance languages do not distinguish between utility and usefulness— then the questions which we tend to think belong to ethics and economics, questions such as whether or not utility is an intrinsic quality of acts or rule or commodities, or an inherent property, or some other, should not be ignored. If the utility of grain is the same after an abundant harvest as it is in time of famine, as W.F. Lloyd argued in his influential Oxford lecture of a century ago, then the term utility cannot express some quality inherent in a commodity, although his conclusion that therefore it is “a feeling of the mind” does not follow.

There are three aspects of the employment of the term “useful” with which we must be concerned if we are to understand the concept of use. The first has to do with specific properties of the entity which is said to be useful. The second has to do with the agent for whom it is useful and with his ability to do something with, or to be in some way related to that entity. The third has to do with the end or the purpose for which he finds or makes it useful. In simple terms:  $X$  is useful to  $A$  for  $P$ .

Consider the properties of an apple. Among these are certain properties shared with all entities; existence, the ability to be referred to, etc. Beyond these are ranges of properties which may specifically apply; being red, weighing 120 grams, and other physical properties. There are also ranges of properties which cannot apply, being read, having an IQ of 120, or other intentional properties of an agent. Furthermore it may be said that apples have certain functional properties such as the capability of being eaten, or being painted by an artist. One might very well object to considering such as properties, for as long as the apple is only *capable* of being eaten, it is not eaten; but whether or not one is comfortable with calling such capabilities properties matters little. As concepts they lead us conveniently to the notion of ends. The usefulness of an entity applies only to specific possible ends. I can eat an apple to nourish my body, to relieve boredom, to keep the legendary doctor away. I cannot eat an apple in order to make it rain in Spain or in order to pay my taxes or to make  $2+2=5$ .

Some entities seem to have other properties as well. A book may be 5” by 8” by 2”, be maroon and leather-bound. It may have various functional capabilities (which derive from the physical): It can level my desk if placed under a corner. Furthermore, it may be said to be instructive, historically accurate, deeply moving, or aesthetically valueless. These too, whether or not one wishes to call them all real features of the book, do lead us to the ends; a level desk, an aesthetic experience, truth, etc.

And an agent is necessary for the notion of usefulness to obtain. Nothing is useful to the Sun or to Venus, and water is useful to plants only if we metaphorically consider them as agents. Plants use water to grow in the same sense as planets use gravity to stay in orbit. This usefulness is picturesque, but misleading. It is because I find my desk askew that I find a book useful to level it. It is because I have no currency in my pocket that I use a credit card. It is only because of agency that these entities can be said to be useful. Xenophon suggests that a flute can be useless for one who cannot play it, but indeed be useful, because others can. If there were no agents there would be no uses.

The fact that something can be used to satisfy divergent kinds of ends should not exclude from our consideration the question of standard or normal use. Aristotle's functionalism caused him to argue in his discussions about nature that some things do have natural ends. An acorn's natural end is to become an oak tree, even if the squirrel considers its nutritive value more important to him. A book can be used to level a desk, but that is not its standard use. That is not why books are made, nor is it what books are used for most of the time. Books are made to be read, and resultantly can convey information, refer, convince of some alleged truth, move the reader emotionally, please him aesthetically, outrage him politically, satisfy him religiously, and so on.

Is there a standard use of poetry? Of course poetry is used for various ends. It can be used to persuade (as in Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*) or to give a warm feeling (as in the poetry of Edgar A. Guest). It can be used to sell products, to satisfy a creative urge, to express devotion or patriotic pride, to work out vague feelings, to increase the earnings of the poet, and so on. Not every one of these is the business of poetry as poetry, however. A definition of poetry is far beyond the ambitions of this essay, but it is of interest to note that sometimes, as, for instance, in Buchler's recent book poetry is defined by showing how poetry functions as poetry.<sup>1</sup> For our purposes it is sufficient to note that poetry consists of sounds, of ideas, and of an organization which permits the interrelationships of ideas, symbols and meanings to be exploited. "The business of the poet," said I. A. Richards, "is to give order and coherence, and so freedom, to a body of experience."<sup>2</sup> A poem is not just a decorated idea. Heidegger was not altogether wrong in insisting, in *Vortraege und Aufsaeetze* that the nature of poetry lies in thinking, and it is this aspect, rather than the purely formal that the most effective uses of poetry are found. These general observations obtain for all poetry, of any type, of any era.

Now the particular poetry which was available to Plato was not the poetry of Coleridge or Wordsworth or Stevens or Spender. It was largely Homeric and had its own particular characteristics. What these were, emerges from a serious reading of the poets, or, lacking this experience, with considerable loss, from the reading of the Platonic dialogues in which the excerpts appear. An analysis of the poems is not the goal here, but an analysis of the use of the poems, even though this might violate what some would consider the standard use of the poem.

The number of instances of poetic references in Plato depends upon how one counts, and whether allusions or only direct quotations are allowed to be called instances. By the most conservative methods of cataloging, there are at least several hundred very specific references to the poets in the dialogues. Indirect references or unacknowledged utilizations escalate the count dramatically, but these are not our concern. The question at issue is how Plato, in clearly identified situations of direct reference to the poets, uses the poetic lines for his own ends. The citations given here are not arranged in order of importance, nor chronologically. To raise the issue of importance would lead us suddenly and incorrigibly away from the topic, and because of the wide disputes about the dating of the dialogues, to assume a chronology and follow it would raise secondary issues which once more would direct us from the matter at hand. Therefore the arrangement of data in what follows is of no significance at all.

#### **I. Trivial uses of the poets—**

It is a conspicuous trait in Plato, as well as in many writers, to include the words of well-known authors in their works, not as authoritative, not as suggestions that the contexts were in any way parallel, but, it would seem, for no other reason than the writer liked the words, and considered them fitting at the place.

"From these notions, then, 'grasp what I would tell,' as Pindar says," Plato writes in *Meno* 76d, referring to a passage of Pindar only known fragmentarily today. Early in *Phaedrus* (227d) Plato uses the poet in the same way: "What? Don't you realize that I should account it, in Pindar's words, 'above all business' to hear how you and Lysias passed your time?"

The *Symposium* is laced with such references, all out of context, and suggesting nothing but the erudition of the author and his entrancement with a poetic phrase which is sometimes identified, sometimes not. "And now I will tell you about another thing 'our valiant hero dared and did' in the course of some campaign." The words, placed in the mouth of Alcibiades, refer to the historical Socrates, not



to Odysseus, as in the Homeric reference. On several occasions in the *Symposium* these uses are called "tags" by Michael Joyce in his almost paraphrastic translation. "If," says Eryximachus (177a), "I may preface my remarks by a tag from Euripides, 'the tale is not my own,' as Melanippe says,..." Again (214b) Alcibiades uses Homer's *Iliad* in the same way. "What do you say?" retorted Alcibiades, "We have to take your orders, you know. What's the tag? — 'A good physician's more than all the world'."

*Republic* is not without its casual utilizations of the poet's words, as, for instance in 411b the Homeric expression "feeble warrior" is used as a set of words familiar to the hearers which embellish the arguments concerning the guardians. In 424b Plato quotes a line from the first book of the *Odyssey*, the song "which hovers newest on the singer's lips." An example of less precisely fixed references can be found in 328e. "...the thing that the poets call 'the threshold of old age'." In *Laws* II, 660e, the unjust man is pitiable and miserable, "even though he were 'richer than Midas or Cinyras,'" "a reference to Tyrtaeus 12.6; and in the tenth book the indolent man is called what Hesiod called him, "most like a stingless drone" (901a). Homer too is used on those pages to provide the choice words describing the seamen who are "turned from their course by the 'flow and flavor' of wine."

These uses are trivial only in the substantive sense. They do perform certain literary tasks. They make the prose more dramatic and readable. They catch the reader's attention. They add to the aesthetic value of the speeches, but they do not contribute to the content of the work. The cases here cited are only a very small sample of the enormous number of instances available in the dialogues,

## II. Stylistic use of the poets

While the trivial uses of the words of the poets might contribute to the literary value of a dialogue they do not as such alter style. The inclusion of passages as well as words does affect style and is deliberately used in certain dialogues to achieve a stylistic effect. Consider *Symposium* 195d :

For it is Homer; is it not, who writes of Ate as being both divine and dainty — dainty of foot, that is. "How delicate," he says — How delicate her feet who shuns the ground, Stepping a — tiptoe on the heads of men.

This technique affects style in two ways : (a) It is a style, or part of a style of writing. To lace one's prose with snippets of recognized verse is to have already made a commitment of style. Style, of course, is not just formal syntax. It presupposes something more than just linguistic considerations. Exactly what this something

more is generates all the debates. Undoubtedly there are expressive components and other elements, the analysis of which is beyond our present concerns. Nevertheless, to choose this device as an element of one's commitments is part of what it means to adopt a style. (b) It generates a style. Only a page or two beyond the previous quotation Plato has Agathon say "And now I am moved to summon the aid of verse, and tell how it is (Love) who makes.

Peace among all men, and a windless, waveless main;

Repose for winds, and slumber in our pain.

This is reminiscent of Homeric style, indeed even to the point of using Homeric expressions like "windless calm" (*Odyssey* V, 391), but it does not explicitly refer to the Homeric work, nor literally quote from it. Plato gives every indication that he is quite capable of, and willing to utilize the stylistic power of the poets, and with significant effect.

Sometimes the effect is very pronounced. Plato even writes verse in the Homeric style, vaguely attributing it to "certain Homeric scholars in their unpublished works." (*Phaedrus* 252b), and adding his own punning embellishments.<sup>3</sup>

### III. Positive use of the Poets' Insights

One of the largest categories of instances of the citation of poets is the one based upon agreement with what the poets have said. A generalized paraphrase of the comments associated with these instances would be "It's just like Homer said," or, "The poet was right when he said..." This use is not an appeal to authority. Indeed it is just the opposite. The insight of the poet is vindicated. His observation is correct, not because he made it, but because of the evidence provided.

In *Phaedo* 94c-e, Plato reflects upon his argument about the soul and attunement and notes,

Well, surely we can see now that the soul works in just the opposite way...It is just like Homer's description in the *Odyssey* where he says that Odysseus

Then beat his breast, and thus reproved his heart;

Endure, my heart; still worse hast thou endured.

Do you suppose that when he wrote that he thought that the soul was an attunement, liable to be swayed by physical feelings? Surely he regarded it as capable of swaying and controlling them, as something much to divine to rank as an attunement. In that case there is no justification for our saying that soul is a kind of attunement. We should neither agree with Homer nor be consistent ourselves.

Socrates, in discussing with Laches the possible inconsistency of being courageous and yet beating a strategic retreat, in *Laches* 191ab, says,

Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as pursuing, and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they knew "how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither," and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him "a deviser of fear or flight."

Laches replies, "Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right."

Not only Socrates, but his antagonists in argument use the poets in this way. Callicles, in *Gorgias* 484b, says, "It seems to me that Pindar expresses what I am saying in that ode in which he writes,....." and suggests that what Euripides says in *Antiope* is true, not because of Euripides' authority, but because his judgements turn out to have been vindicated by Callicles' experience.

In *Philebus* 47e Socrates asks whether it is necessary to remind ourselves of some lines in *Iliad*, and Protarchus replies, "No, what you say is precisely what must happen." The poet makes the same point, but his insights simply parallel those of the philosopher. The poet is not cited as a source of truth, but a confirmer of truth. Poets can be reliable, at least at times. What they say is frequently true. They are "among the inspired and so, by the help of their Graces and Muses, often enough hit upon true historical fact" (*Laws*, III, 682a). Being correct "often enough" is a far cry from being always reliable. Indeed, sometimes the truth is the very opposite of what the poets say.

#### IV. Negative use of the alleged insights of the poets—

If the accusations against the poets in *Republic X*, accusations which result in their banishment, are more than the verbal fallout of a tantrum, we must expect the poets to be put down elsewhere, not just for having a deleterious effect upon society (because of their engendering irrational emotional states) but because they are simply wrong in what they say.

A simple instance can be found in *Euthyphro*. In 12ab, Socrates is straightforward :

What I have to say is not so hard to grasp. I mean the very opposite of what the poet wrote.

Zeus, who brought that all to pass,

And made it all to grow,

You will not name,

For where fear is, there too is reverence.

On that I differ from the poet. Shall I tell you why?...I do not think that "where fear is, there too is reverence." For it seems to me that there are many

who fear sickness, poverty, and all the like, and so are afraid, but have no reverence whatever for the things that are afraid of.

Sometimes the poet is wrong, not on factual grounds, but on formal grounds. Simonides is attacked by Protagoras in *Protagoras* 339a-d because his poems are inconsistent. Protagoras had made being an authority on poetry the most important part of one's education, and that meant being able to criticize a poem logically as well as testing it against the facts of experience. His rejection of Simonides is countered by Socrates, not by an appeal to authority, but by conceding that inconsistency is bad, and that poets can be inconsistent, yet insisting that Simonides is not really inconsistent on *this* point. That a poet speaking nonsense must be unceremoniously attacked is an unalterable consequence of Socrates' commitment to truth.

It sometimes would appear, as some have suggested, that poets are used as authorities by Plato, and that their words appear to be used authoritatively. If it happens at all (and we shall examine that problem shortly), it is surely not always the case. In the often quoted passages in *Republic* II Socrates says (379c,d), "Then we must not accept from Homer or any other poet the folly of such error as this..." No poet must be allowed to tell us falsehoods about the gods (381d). Sometimes what they say is the very opposite of the truth. The arguments of the early part of book III make clear that a knowledgeable person should have little difficulty discerning the simple falsities of Homer and the other poets when they write about the gods. Their statements are so ludicrous that only our awareness that derisive laughter can be unwholesome prevents our laughing the poets right out of court. In book X, at the final dispatch of the poets, Plato acknowledges his respect for Homer, the first teacher of the beauties of tragedy, yet, he adds, "We must not honor a man above the truth." The poets can be used, even when wrong. Their falsities can make the philosopher's truth clearer and more compelling. In cases where the poet's error is popularly accepted, and bears upon the promulgation of the philosopher's truth, the poet will be used, and Plato will say, "The truth is the antithesis of what the poet says."

#### **V. The Alleged Authoritative use of the Poets—**

There is something odd in thinking that the poets could be authoritative for Plato. Sometimes one finds the poet used as an authority by persons engaged in arguments against Socrates, as by Callicles in *Gorgias* 484-485. But if the use is genuinely that of authority it is not "What Euripides says is true" (484e) as a matter of fact, but that it is true because the poet says so. In other passages, however, the words of Homer are used with what would seem to be something



closer to authority. The citation of Homer in *Republic* 468d concerning the honoring of valiant youth sounds like more than a passing observation that Homer was as a matter of fact correct. "We will then, said I, take Homer as our guide in this at least" Socrates concludes.

The admonition to use the poet as guide occurs on more than one occasion in Plato. Socrates, in his charming conversation with Lysis and Menexenus, turns to Lysis and says,

Let us proceed, however, on this line of inquiry no longer — for I look upon it as a very difficult sort of road — but let us go back again to that point at which we turned aside, and follow in the steps of the poets. For poets, I conceive, are as good as fathers and guides to us as mothers of wisdom. (Lysis 213e-214a).

Homer is appealed to in a direct way at the end of *Laches*, where Jowett translates Socrates in the following way: "If anyone laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says, 'Modesty is not good for a needy man'."

#### VI. The Use of poets as sources of ideas—

It would not be difficult for Plato, or any other honest thinker, to discover that many of his own ideas and the ideas current at this time could be discovered in the works of earlier thinkers. We can never assume, however, that an earlier idea is necessarily the cause or the direct ancestor of a later idea merely by virtue of its temporal priority. There is a big difference, on the one hand, in noting that the doctrine of universal flux in Heraclitus can be found in a "primitive state of elaboration" in Homer, and noting, on the other, that the earlier formulation influenced the later, and was indeed the cause of Heraclitus' belief. Nevertheless, Socrates, in noting that Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedicles, and indeed perhaps all the philosophers except Parmenides, agree on the primacy of becoming, asserts that the *Iliad* mentions that all things are the offspring of a stream of change, and says emphatically "Who would challenge so great an array, with Homer for its captain, and not make himself a laughingstock? (*Theatetus* 153a). But Theatetus' ideas are not Socrates'. It is quite common for his adversaries in the dialogues to be pictured as deriving their ideas from the poets. "It is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer" he flatly tells Polemarchus in *Republic* I (334a).

Some attributions of origins can be found for Socrates' ideas. The poets are credited with originating the myth of the metals in *Republic* III, and Hesiod specifically in VIII (547a). Yet myth is not doctrine. It is a device to facilitate

belief. The contributions of the poets to the beliefs of Plato himself are not so readily admitted. Some aspects of the afterlife are clearly derivative, such as the recognized reference to Tatarus in the *Iliad*, which is cited in the discussion in *Phaedo* 112a, but there is little to suggest that Plato was aware of any serious contributions of the poets to his basic views of immortality. There is very little in common between Homer's *psyche*, the ghost present in a living person which leaves at the instant of death, and Plato's surviving soul. If a Homeric influence is there it is only through the transforming apparatus of the Orphic religion. In general Plato is quite reluctant to cite precursors of his philosophical beliefs, especially among the poets, although is not so tight-lipped concerning the philosophers, such as the Pythagoreans. But either Plato saw no influence of the poets, or he refused to admit it, or indeed his ideas were not to any significant extent influenced by the poets. The last is the most believable choice.

### Conclusion

This sketchy catalogue of some uses of the poets by Plato leaves unanswered the question why, and unresolved the misgivings about the appropriateness of such actions by one whose philosophy is generally seen as irreconcilably hostile to the poet and his work. The degree of hostility, of course, is a matter of dispute among commentators, but to deny that Plato sees the poet as an unworthy rival to the philosopher, not only in an ideal state but in any mode of practice, would be to close irresponsibly one's eyes to the recurring references in the dialogues, and to a central and unalterably held theme in the developed philosophy.

Plato's utilization of the words of the poets in what has been characterized above as a trivial sense causes us no difficulties. In spite of his conviction that the poets have been literally bad for the existing state and ideally bad for the ideal state, Plato was a product of a time and a culture in which the educational system was built around the epic poets. The picture which Protagoras gives in the dialogue called by his name (325-327) is not a fictional one. The children of wealthy parents were inspired by the stories of good men of old in the poetic writings. Later they studied the lyric poets, and thus became "more civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves, and so more capable in whatever they say or do,..." Homer and the later poets were the teachers of Athens. It was only as an adult that Plato challenged that role, and even as an adult he could not escape the consequences of an aristocratic education in Greece. His mother Periktone traced her lineage to Dropides, kinsman of Solon. His father Ariston was a distinguished citizen, and his stepfather Pyrilampes was a friend of Pericles, and ambassador for the king. That heritage guaranteed an early

training in the poets which was so deeply ingrained that it, for Plato as well as for the rest of the educated ones resulted in both conscious and unconscious, deliberate and accidental, uses of Homeric terms and phrases, much as the Puritans used, and the Puritan tradition still uses. Biblical quotations to clarify, embroider, and accent all discourse. Homer and the other poets represent a literature and a vocabulary with which Plato was most familiar. It could not fail to color his speech and writing. It should be hardly surprising to read "As Homer puts it..." (*Republic* VII, 516d), or "To quote Homer..." (*Theatetus*, 183e), or "As Hesiod says..." (*Theatetus*, 207a).

There seems to be good evidence that Plato's misgivings about, indeed his fear of what the poet could do to the youth and ultimately the society, are not merely musings, but the result of first-hand knowledge. Considering the dialogues not as philosophy but as literature, Plato emerges as the consummate poet. The arguments that certain extant fragments of lyric verse were written by Plato may be shaky, but the great dramatic dialogues are examples of the kind of moving, emotionally powerful works that his philosophy rejects. This tension between the poet and the philosopher does not escape him. Even if one rejects *Epistle* II as spurious (a generous concession to scholarly skepticism), there is enough suggested in *Epistle* VII to assure us that Plato's philosophy was intended to be taught in the Academy, not in the dialogues. They at best dramatize the thought of Socrates and indicate the contrast of Plato's commitments with those of the competing schools. Even the later so called unsocratic writings contain only those aspects of of Plato's philosophy which he made public by addressing a broader range of hearers, and these writings, even the relatively dull *Laws*, are still distinctively poetic works. The real philosophy is not capable of being encapsuled in writing. "I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way of putting it in words, like other studies," he writes in *Epistle* VII (341c) and adds that if there were to be such a treatise written, *he* would be the best prepared to do it. But not only *will* he not, he *cannot* write it, and, by obvious inference, no one else can either. *Epistle* II adds, "...there is not and will not be any written work of Plato's own. What are now called his are the work of a Socrates embellished and modernized" (314c). But in works that are called Plato's, and are indeed his, the words and the style that his education and training have insinuated into the writings have, regardless of his criticisms, made him a poet. The use of the teachings of the epic poets in either a positive or negative sense is also a literary device which often proved successful for Plato. The *ad hominum* arguments which do sometimes appear in Plato's works are passing philosophical slips. He never mounts an attack on the content of the teaching of the poets solely on the fact that it was a poet who said it. In spite of

the viciousness of his attack in *Republic*, and the parallel running antagonism toward Sophism, Plato was quite capable of acknowledging the worth of an insight, even when it came from a poet. Not only can accepted virtues be celebrated in poetry, but the poet may be the one whose formulation of certain virtues should be emphasized. Even in *Republic*, poetry has a functional role. The trouble is not that the poet is always wrong. Often the trouble is that he waffles. He lacks the canons requisite for public morality. Thus the great admiration expressed for the Egyptians in *Laws* 656. They, at least, drew sharp lines.

The negative use of Homer is particularly easy to justify. If his teachings are familiar and often false, it is the writer's responsibility to use the poems and append refutations. If Hesiod, who was greatly influenced by Homer, felt the responsibility to announce his opposition, why not the philosopher? If Pindar, of whom it is traditionally said that he spoke only what he believed, could attack Homer with a kind of grudging admiration :

On his falsehood and his winged cunning a majesty lies  
and tricks and deceives us with tales  
and blind is the heart of the multitude of man,

(*Nem.* VII 22-24).

how much more has the philosopher responsibility to point out the errors. Greeks, unlike moderns, felt no awkwardness in calling these errors "lies", and their forthrightness may be a contributing factor in our tendency to think that Homer was the authority for all of Athens who had to be attacked for his falsehoods. We seldom speak today of poets lying, whether or not there is any significant intentional ground for the untruth. In his parallel discussion of myth Gadamer writes :

It is now said, not that poets tell lies, but that they are incapable of saying anything true, since they have an aesthetic effect only and merely seek to rouse through their imaginative creations the imagination and the emotions of their hearers or readers. <sup>4</sup>

The alleged use of the poets as authoritative is a larger puzzle, and, indeed, if it actually occurred, would be inconsistent with the philosophy of Socrates taught, and that of Plato hinted at, in the dialogues. As the educational system in Athens admiringly utilized the poets' compendia of practical wisdom it was easy for an authoritative ethics or political philosophy to blur itself into power. This ethics and derivative political theory outraged Plato. It is hard to imagine a genuinely authoritative poetical utterance in the thinking of one so convinced of the destructive social effects of the poet's work. A close look at the texts indicates a



consistent practice of avoiding giving any authority to the poetic works. The *Laws* say a good deal about the establishment of authorities in all areas of life, including the arts. But these were to be government agencies, and the procedure a far cry from accepting the authority of Homer. Traditional authorities of all kinds are suspect. The context is medicine, not poetry, but the position of Socrates in *Phaedrus* 270c is consistent with the stance of the dialogues in general.

Phaedrus : If we are to believe Hippocrates, the Aesclepiad, we can't understand even the body without such a procedure.

Socrates : No, my friend, and he is right, but we must not just rely on Hippocrates, we must examine the assertion and see whether it accords with the truth.

The appeal to Homer at the end of *Laches*, which Jowett renders "...quote to the authority of Homer," can be read, in fact, should be read in a much weaker sense, and if one considers the context, it is anything but an argument from authority. Confidentially, he says, each of us should seek out the best teacher for ourselves and for our youth, and, "if anyone laughs at us for going to school at our age I would, quoting Homer, say to him, 'Modesty is not good for a needy man'." Now that is not at all like using Homer as an authority for what one accepts. It is using Homer to get agreement from people who do accept his authority, but don't know what you are really up to. There is some innocent misunderstanding today about the alleged authority of Homer at the time of Plato. Never in Athens were the poems of Homer considered sacred. Pindar could with impunity call them lies. For the untutored masses to treat Homer as "authoritative" meant little more than to admit to Homer as the source of their ideas, perhaps to act as if these ideas were correct, but certainly not to treat them as absolute religious truths. The fact that there is no passage in Plato in which he uses the poets as authorities makes him, on this crucial point, in spite of his fear and distrust of Homer, and the ultimate banishment of the poets, not all that different in his thinking from the masses, none of whom had to worry about Homeric heresies or other consequences of strict authoritarianism.

The masses did get their ideas from Homer, at least many of their pivotal ideas. They were derived from the oral tradition, the purely oral nature of which, incidentally is much less confidently held today than in earlier periods of scholarly research. The educated minority got some of their important ideas from Homer too, but from reading him in their schools, in their tutoring in poetry. As a source of pleasure, of motivation, of ideas, Homer was available to all. Perhaps it was the awareness of this wide Homeric audience which led Plato to reach out beyond the band of students in the Academy to write dramatic dialogues. As Stanley Rosen once perceptively observed :

There is a quality that Plato and Homer have in common; owing to the harmony of their expression they are accessible to everybody, no matter how one wishes to approach them. <sup>5</sup>

The paradox of Plato's use of the poets becomes less paradoxical the more we think of Plato as artist. "Plato was always sensitive to the poetic genius," said Shorey, "and there was no time when he might not have praised Homer without conspicuous irony." <sup>6</sup> The trouble, as Plato saw it, was that the poet aimed at pleasure, not the Good, and therefore his fine lines had to be kept under the control of the philosopher. The poet can contribute to philosophy, but his was not the time, nor Athens the place for the undisciplined enjoyment of the poet's art. Indeed nowhere, not even in the glory of the ideal state, can the poet be left to his own devices. But his works can be used by philosophers like Plato, who by their distinctive activity do not merely proclaim the truth, but equip their hearers to understand and evaluate that which is offered as the truth. Michael Polanyi summed it up in his convincing arguments about the role of the reader, suggesting that the reader or hearer imposes limits on the meanings which the poets put in their works :

The use of a work of art by others is not, therefore, like the use of an invention, such as the telephone. We do not have to recreate A.G. Bell's imaginative vision of the telephone in order to use it ... But we do have to achieve an imaginative vision in order to "use" a work of art, that is, to understand and enjoy it aesthetically. <sup>7</sup>

That is what Plato was able to do with poets. The tensions were there, but they became creative in the imaginative aesthetic vision. And through this purely aesthetic relationship with the poets his work was enriched, the arguments made more understandable, and the poet-philosopher was born. Philosophy as well as literature is the better for that.

#### Notes—

1. Justus Buchler, *The Main of Light : On the Concept of Poetry* (Oxford University Press, 1974.)
2. I.A. Richards, *Science and Poetry*. 2nd ed. (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935), p.6.
- 3 See my "Plato on Writing and Doing Philosophy," in *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (April-June, 1966), 163-172
4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), p. 243.
5. *Plato's Symposium* (Yale University Press, 1960), xxxix.
6. *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (University of Chicago Press, 1903), p. 81.
7. Michael Polanyi, *Meaning* (University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 85.

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## THE END OF LYRIC POETRY

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The poem is the end product which can have psychological, ethical, political or social functions. Only then can Crane's statement that "Aristotelianism is only a pragmatic and non-exclusive commitment to hypotheses about poetry and poetics", be accepted. To deny these multiple functions is to deny the place of literature in the wider context of life. Olson seeks to stress only the artistic nature.<sup>1</sup> When art is examined as a skill, as having a bearing on human life, Aristotle takes it up in his *Ethics*. In his *Politics* he shows that art has a social and political function.<sup>2</sup> In his *Metaphysics* he considers art as a mode of being. These aspects are not denied in the *Poetics*, nor are they emphasised. He refers to the theoretic purposes served by the poets.<sup>3</sup> Aristotle accepted multiple frameworks in his evaluation of poetry; and if we accept his methodology we cannot ignore these frameworks which in their totality offer a comprehensive approach.

Aristotle employs different languages when he talks about poetry. These are all relevant if only we remember that the language of *poetics* owes a good deal to his various treatises. The terms like whole, part, unity, complete, magnitude, beauty and imitation come from his *Metaphysics*. His *Physics* defines the terms probability and necessity. *Hamartia* and other terms come from *Ethics*. *Katharsis* appears in *Politics*. Pity, fear, emotions, and poetic thought are outlined in *Rhetoric*. The concepts of soul and organic unity are to be found in *de Anima*. If we derive our interpretation of these concepts from the different texts of Aristotle, we are not forbidden from interpreting a poem or a play from different stand-points after examining it as an artistic whole. As McKeon puts it, "a given critic may successively employ more than one of the modes of criticism and may even combine two or more of them...in a single theory or application of criticism."<sup>4</sup> Crane admits that bibliography, linguistics, textual criticism, philological exegesis, the study of the sources, biography, the history of the theatre, and the analysis

and history of ideas "are all essential tools for the kind of critical research we are considering".<sup>5</sup> Then a critic like Olson is entirely mistaken when he insists only on the artistic product. Evidently Olson cannot forget his Hume when he foists on Aristotle.

Crane asserts that "the different inquiries (in *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, *Ethics*, *Politics*, *Physics*, and *Metaphysics*) do indeed converge, but they converge upon objects which, though empirically the same, are given by no means exactly the same conceptual status or definition in the varied 'methods' which Aristotle brings to bear upon them."<sup>6</sup> The *dynamis* of a poem is clearly related to the object of imitation and to the devices of technique whereby the object is revealed.<sup>7</sup> But the object is not unrelated to the larger context of human life. No Greek could ever evaluate a work of art as if it had no bearing on the varied aspects of life. In some of his lucid moments even Olson states that the productive sciences which are the arts "derive propositions from both theoretical and practical sciences."<sup>8</sup> Naturally the works of art cannot be satisfactorily evaluated if we look at them as pure and simple artistic wholes. It is true that Aristotle observes that the standard of correctness in poetry is not the same as that of politics or any other branch of study. But the same Aristotle writes: "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good."<sup>9</sup> The good that poetry aims at depends upon the manner the plots are constructed.<sup>10</sup> "The good which the poet pursues as his immediate end is (only) the excellent making of poems, as poems, in their respective kinds."<sup>11</sup> Aristotle clearly states that "in all sciences and arts the end is a good."<sup>12</sup> He also observes that "the end of productive science is the work produced."<sup>13</sup> This does not mean that we should ignore the varied implications of a work of art; for any artistic product has a certain influence on the sensitive reader. Anything can be defined, says Aristotle, only through its working or power;<sup>14</sup> and "purpose is present in art."<sup>15</sup> What is this purpose? Is it merely the formal one of achieving an excellence in a certain mode? "A function is performed well when performed in accordance with the excellence proper to it."<sup>16</sup> A blind reliance on such statements falsifies the method of Aristotle; and the critic tends to forget that he is quoting passages from outside the *Poetics*.

Any good poem must enable the reader to understand and evaluate human experience. The Neo-Aristotelians appear to minimise this role. If the final cause of the poem were to be only the perfection of its own form, what is its place in human life? Even Aristotle recognises that poetry has its place in social life. Can we deny the relation between poetry and morals? According to Aristotle, we cannot deny such a relationship, but we cannot treat moral standards

as those applicable to a poem as a poem. But the poem is not merely a poem, since it is an imitation of men in action. The Chicagoans cannot easily ignore the significance of the expression "men-in-action". If they do, they will only be accepting the stand of the New Critics. Crane, however, is not guilty of such a standpoint, though at times he is misled into such a formalist position. Olson, on the other hand, is more a formist than a formalist, though in his work on Dylan Thomas he forgets Aristotle and also his own favourite Hume.

The end of a poem is realised in the perfection of its form, according to the Chicago critics. This perfection depends on its organic unity. Murray Krieger argues that the concept of organic unity "involves by implication a theory of creativity that would preclude such organicism."<sup>17</sup> What does creativity involve? As a good Neo-Aristotelian would say, creativity implies the evolution of an organic form from within. Krieger's idea of creativity appears to be the biblical one of creating out of nothing. Aristotle emphasises not the creative process, but the realization of a perfection in the structure of the work. Even if we use the concept of creativity, we cannot afford to ignore Aristotle's words that the work of art "*resembles a living organism*". Aristotle never spoke of organic unity. He only referred to something similar to an organic unity. The idea of an organic form emerges in the theory of Coleridge, for Coleridge was more interested in the genesis of a work of art. Krieger and critics like him appear to confuse the Aristotelian theory with the Coleridgean.

Crane and Olson hold that the final cause of poetry is only the perfection of its own form. Assuming that poetry has a moral value, Crane does not go into the question of a difference in the moral values of any two poems. Further, why should a poem awaken or allay a strong emotion? <sup>18</sup> Winters is right in posing this question. The Chicagoans seek to underplay the idea of Katharsis. It is true that Aristotle talks of Katharsis in the contexts of music and tragedy. But in the *Politics* Aristotle clearly promised to give a detailed explanation of the concept of Katharsis in his treatise on poetry. The very reference makes it clear that every form of poetry brings about a Katharsis of some kind or other. When Aristotle asserts that every kind of poetry evokes the pleasure proper to it, why should he mention Katharsis separately? There is evidently a serious mis-understanding on the part of the Chicago critics in this context. If a tragedy can have the pleasure proper to it and also a Katharsis, it is reasonable to assume that every poem can have two functions, if not more.

The works of art do communicate certain ideas concerning righteousness, play, material concerns, spiritual values, humour, valour, love and death. The righteous welcome righteousness, the lovers love; self control is intended for the

vicious, and forgiveness is taught to the wise. The valiant learn enthusiasm, the ignorant are awakened and the wise become wiser.<sup>19</sup> A work of art has then a moral function transcending its purely artistic value; for it follows the normal human life (*Loka Vrittānusarana*) and its activities.<sup>20</sup> Explaining this moral function Abhinava states that it temporarily removes the experience of sorrow, and thereby it offers a relaxation or a repose. A man in sorrow develops a zest (*dhriti*) for life, a sick person enjoys somethings like a play (*Kriḍā*), a fatigued one gets happiness.<sup>21</sup> Then the work of art is an imitation of life—'*Loka Vrittānukaranam*'.<sup>22</sup> Consequently it presents the ideas, states and the like experienced by human beings; and it has a moral function, not a didactic one. Morality enunciated by a work of art appeals to the imagination, not to the intellect. This leads Bharata to say :

Na taj jñānam na tac chilpam nasā vidyā na sā kalā

Nāsau yogo na tat karma nātye' smin yan na dṛiṣyate.<sup>23</sup>

Knowledge, sculpture, wisdom, art, contemplation, and activity— if these are not found in literature they cannot be found any where.

The work of art does imitate the actions of human beings as they are known—*pūrvā vrittānu—Caritam*.<sup>24</sup> The artist is expected to know well the behaviour and nature of persons; and yet he has to transform this with the aid of the artistic activity. There is, however, no restriction regarding the *bhāvas*<sup>25</sup> (ideas, thoughts), *rasas*, states of life and activities. Even when the artist imitates life he has to follow the law of probability.<sup>26</sup> According to Bharata, a work of art cannot claim absolute autonomy. It may have an independent being. But when we admit that there is a relation between art and life, following Aristotle and Bharata, we cannot be satisfied with a vague concept like that of pleasure. Literature emerges from life and its appeal is to the living human beings. Any dissociation between the two is bound to distort the nature of both. The Chicago critics, like the neo-classicists, seem to swear by the words of Aristotle, even though they admit that the *Poetics* cannot be dissociated from the total framework of Aristotle's philosophical system. What Aristotle did not mention in the *Poetics*, that Bharata did in his great work, the *Nāṭya Śāstra*.

Olson writes : "we may indeed worry about whether, on the contrary, it is not an absurdity to conceive of a poem — that is, any imitative poem — as having a theme or meaning. The words have a meaning ; they mean the poem ; but why should the poem itself have any further meaning"<sup>27</sup>. A peculiar fellow-traveller of Olson is Eliseo Vivas who says : "what (the poem) means is not a world it reflects, or imitates, or represents in illusion, in the sense of a world as

envisaged by the mind prior to the poetic activity in the manner in which it is envisaged in poetry. What the poem says or means is the world it reveals or discloses *in* and *through* itself, a new world, whose features, prior to the act of poetic revelation, were concealed from us and whose radiance and even identity will again be concealed from us the moment our intransitive attention lapses and we return to the world of affairs and of things in which we normally live"<sup>28</sup>. Both Olson and Vivas are in a sense returning to the heresy of art for art's sake because of their eagerness to preserve the autonomy of the world of poetry. There are other ways to preserve this autonomy, if only we remember that the poetic world can only be relatively autonomous.

The poem as a mimetic structure "presents a meaning distilled from the human scene, and to this extent itself" it is mimetic<sup>29</sup>. The meaning comes from the world of human affairs, and such a meaning cannot stand by itself. The function of poetry is then intimately bound up with human life. Even if the Chicagoans forget it, Aristotle himself was constantly aware of it. Aristotle suggested that poetry satisfies both our appetite for imitation and our appetite for harmony<sup>30</sup>. The cognitive element tends to stress the first, but not in a separate or distinct way from the second, which tends to express itself in structure<sup>31</sup>. The cognitive element involves some form of realism and also a certain knowledge. The poem gives us some knowledge, and knowledge is transitive and reflexive. If this is true, what are we to do with the statements concerning pleasure? Butcher at least refers to *rational* enjoyment, and so far he is faithful to the system of Aristotle. The neo-Aristotelians appear to be ignoring the rational aspect.

Art being an imitation, it evokes pleasure in proportion to its similarity to the original. Does this pleasure arise from the beauty of the work? Aristotle finds beauty in the work having a unity which results from its magnitude and from the interrelation of its parts. Order, symmetry, and definiteness are some of the features revealed by the work<sup>32</sup>. The work must have proportion<sup>33</sup> and an orderly arrangement of the parts<sup>34</sup>. Such a beautiful work alone gives rise to pleasure or rational enjoyment<sup>35</sup>. This pleasure ultimately depends on the manner of imitation, on the manner of execution<sup>36</sup> and on the intellectual activity "for if some have no graces to charm the sense, yet even these by disclosing to intellectual perception the artistic spirit that designed them, give immense pleasure to all who can trace links of causation and are inclined to philosophy. Indeed it would be strange if mimic representations of these were attractive because they disclose the mimetic skill of the painter or sculptor, and the original realities themselves were not more interesting, to all at any rate who have

eyes to discern the reasons that determined their formation"<sup>37</sup>. Even the portrayal of the ugly can be pleasant. The imitative works "must be pleasant — for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry—and every product of skilful imitation; this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant"<sup>38</sup>. Thus for Aristotle artistic pleasure is not the product of a faithful copying of the original, but it emerges from the manner of imitation and from the knowledge it gives rise to.<sup>39</sup> The pleasure proper to any form of art is intimately bound up with knowledge expressed or communicated by it.

Each form of poetry is said to evoke the pleasure proper to it. Pleasure accompanies an activity and completes it when it is successful. "Without activity pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed by the attendant pleasure". This pleasure is greatest when "both the sense is at its best and it is active in reference to an object which corresponds".<sup>40</sup> Pleasure corresponds to the poetic object. It is not the end or good of poetry. It arises after the experience of the poem is successfully completed. Evidently pleasure is a kind of stasis which rounds off an activity. This activity has a reference to the object of imitation and to the apprehension of the meaning or significance of the total work of art. "A thing's nature is its end : what a thing is when fully developed we call its nature...Again, the final cause or end of a thing is the best and self-sufficiency is therefore the best".<sup>41</sup> The nature of a thing is known when we grasp its essence. Aristotle here seeks to emphasise the integral unity of the essence and existence of a given work. The poem is both a this and a what. It has a unique being of its own. This uniqueness cannot be identified merely with the form of the work.

When Aristotle refers to the form of a work of art, it is to emphasise its concrete being. "Nature shuns the infinite, for the infinite is incomplete, but nature always seeks an end".<sup>42</sup> The work of art cannot be vague or indefinite, nor can it be without a purpose. In other words, every object has a potentiality and also an actuality. We get a clearer idea of the Aristotelian position when we analyse these two concepts. The potentiality of a work is its ability to act or be acted upon. The work acquires an actuality when it is wholly complete, when the form is entirely embodied at every point. This appears when its end is within it. The nature of a work "is always determined by its function : a thing really is itself when it can perform its function".<sup>43</sup> The end is not the mere achievement of a formal wholeness. The nature of an object is also at times determined by what it does. "In some cases of connection the end of the process is the nature of the thing—nature, that is, in the sense of formal cause and essence".<sup>44</sup> A statement like this can be misconstrued if we ignore the metaphysical system of Aristotle.



According to Olson the end of art "is neither knowledge nor action, but the product to be produced".<sup>45</sup> That is, "the productive action is for the sake of the product".<sup>46</sup> But Aristotle accounts for our enjoyment of poetry by referring to the organic relationship of knowing with the pleasure it gives.<sup>47</sup> Olson is clearly following not the method of Aristotle, but the general framework of Hume's philosophy. On the other hand, Art is a kind of knowledge concerned with the universals and causes. It brings about a change, and this is its power.<sup>48</sup> "Now art is a principle of movement in something other than the thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself—for man begets man—, and the other causes are privations of these two".<sup>49</sup> The true artistic principle is not inherently present in the material, but there is something which gives a form and a function to the material. Elsewhere the same idea is stated by Aristotle thus: "the art is the principle and form of the product, but existing in something else, whereas the movement of nature is in the thing itself, issuing from another nature which contains the form in actuality".<sup>50</sup>

Art communicates a knowledge of becoming. "It is directed to actions and productions and therefore like experience treats of individuals, although its special action is of universals, for the artist, unlike the man of experience, knows not only what is the case, but why and the cause".<sup>51</sup> This view brings Aristotle closer to Hegel who spoke of art as the sensuous embodiment of an idea. Traces of this view are found in Plato too. That a work of art presents some kind of knowledge is to be found in the *Metaphysics* too. "All men by nature desire to know".<sup>52</sup> Later he says: "as the horizons of knowledge were gradually enlarged, exponents of the fine arts were invariably considered wiser than those of the useful arts".<sup>53</sup> Art cannot be studied in isolation, for it offers wisdom, not mere structural wholes. A few lines earlier Aristotle stated: "Knowledge and understanding, however, are thought to belong more properly to art than to experience, and artists are considered wiser than those who are limited to experience...An artist knows the cause of a thing, while the other does not".<sup>54</sup> Passages like these are too many in Aristotle's works. They enunciate certain principles which govern his methodology and which indicate the end of art.

Literature, says Abhinavagupta, is not addressed to those who are only happy or who are only unhappy. It is meant for a world that experiences happiness and unhappiness as well. It provides a play which by definition brings about a diffusion and then a concentration of the mind (*Chitta Vikshepa*). Thereby the work of art functions as a sugar-coated pill which diverts the attention of the mind from the empirical problems. Works of art have no place in heaven or in hell. That is, the work of art is addressed to those who experience jealousy, anger,

attachment, or desire. <sup>55</sup> Thus when a person leads a balanced and virtuous life, he does not need the aid of a work of art. <sup>56</sup> In other words, according to Bharata, the works of art are intended to lead the individual towards the path of spiritual progress. This is a more profound conception in so far as literature is related to the spiritual development of mankind. If this is lost sight of, literature has no place in the higher life of man. Here Bharata and Abhinavagupta indicated the specific role of literature.

“Knowledge consists in art rather than in experience, for the artist is capable of transmitting his knowledge to others”.<sup>57</sup> This transmission of knowledge is purely for the sake of knowledge. This is how Aristotle distinguishes fine art from useful art. The inventors of the fine arts were considered wiser because they did not aim at utility.<sup>58</sup>

Art is a power, a principle of change, and it achieves its function effectively by being a productive form of knowledge. “All arts, all productive forms of knowledge”, says Aristotle, “are potencies: they are principles of change in another thing or in the artist himself considered as other”.<sup>59</sup>

Poetry is a making even if it can induce us to act. This making has a dynamism which, in Aristotle's words, is a virtual rejection of the theory of art for art's sake. “Action and making are different kinds of thing...While making has an end other than itself, action, cannot; for good action itself is its end”.<sup>60</sup> One wonders how Olson and others ignored such passages. Possibly they took up from Aristotle the passages they needed and ignored the rest on the ground that those do not appear in the *poetics*. But they do appear in the contexts where Aristotle is seeking to distinguish fine art from other branches of study, and this is enough ground for considering them. “Wisdom in the arts we ascribe to their most finished exponents, for example to Phidios as a sculptor and to Polycritus as a maker of portrait—statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art”.<sup>61</sup> Excellence in art, however, does not mean mere excellence in technique. The sculptor is not only interested in achieving the perfection of form, but in communicating a meaning, a vision of life. Such a meaning or vision arises from a state of contemplation or *Samādhi*, a yogic experience. Taking about a portrait that has failed to communicate a significant meaning, Kālidāsa refers to the artist as having a *śithila samadhi*, a flawed contemplation. Now this contemplation is never directed towards the mere form, but towards an embodied form. Such a contemplation was referred to by Socrates; and the cultured Greeks used their leisure to an exercise of this activity. In its concentrated and precise formulation, the lyric contributes to such an activity.

Leisure, says Aristotle, is the end of toil.<sup>62</sup> Though he admits that "the pleasure of the best man is the best" and that it "springs from the noblest sources", he argues that one must study the various branches of learning "merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these are to be viewed for their own sake".<sup>63</sup> The best man's pleasure is determined by his ideas or values of virtue and wisdom, and the noblest source from which it springs is the rational aspect of the soul. In this light we are told that we should "make right use of leisure" and that this "is the basis of all human activity".<sup>64</sup> In spite of some of the Chicagoans we have to admit that here Aristotle is talking as the first great Platonist. Only let us remember that Platonism is not the same as Plato's teaching found only in his Dialogues. Consider Aristotle's statement: "A particular work and an art and a science must be considered vulgar if it makes the body or soul or mind of free men useless for the employments and actions of virtue".<sup>65</sup> Though he distinguished making from doing, here he argues that making must lead to some form of doing.

The Aristotelian method is not indifferent to the question of values. It is true that the poet is a poet in so far as he presents a beautiful or intrinsically excellent work. As Crane puts it, "the criticism of forms needs to be supplemented by the qualities and also by historical inquiries".<sup>66</sup> The basic problem of art, however, refers to the application of knowledge to the organization of materials. A work of art communicates knowledge, and it must be capable of excellence or virtue.<sup>67</sup> Since the arts are productive powers, they are themselves intellectual virtues.<sup>68</sup> Virtues are habits of action, and therefore they involve knowledge. Man learns through witnessing imitations, and since all learning is natural what is natural is pleasant. He learns through likeness.<sup>69</sup> An awareness of likeness gives rise to a knowledge of the universals arising out of experience. The recognition of likeness is a source of pleasure which is cognitive. That is, Aristotle's idea of the pleasure proper to the form of poetry involves a knowledge proper to that form of poetry. The lyric offers a knowledge of the inward life of the poet, and to banish this inwardness from literature is to go against the Aristotelian methodology.

Poetry is an integral aspect of life and it is therefore related to varied human activities. Its genesis is in life and its content comes from life. Theoretically we may say that we value poetry for its own sake. But can we ignore the other aspects? When Crane states that "we value different poems for the different peculiar pleasures they give us",<sup>70</sup> does a difference in pleasure mean a simple difference in the form? Crane writes: "these differences are determined, in no simple way, by interrelated differences in language, subject matter, technique, and

principles of construction".<sup>71</sup> This is a piece of formatism which is un-Aristotelian. At times Crane appears to be misled by persons like Olson and Weinberg. Mckee, the theoretician of the school, is alive to this serious drawback. The literary critic who accepts the methodology of Aristotle has to reject the arguments of Olson, because Olson's master is not Aristotle, but Hume. The Humean approach to literature is not merely empirical, but sensuous; and Olson, for reasons best known to him, preferred to follow Hume as though Hume followed Aristotle. Here is the greatest weakness of Olson's approach; and to use the modern vocabulary, Olson is the great reactionary and revisionist.

The dramatic work is both seen and heard.<sup>72</sup> As visible it must be pleasant (*hridyam*), and as heard it must be scholarly (*Vyatpatti pradam*). Consequently a drama must be both pleasant and intellectual.<sup>73</sup> Bharata accordingly states that the work of art must inculcate a sense of righteousness; it must teach and show the people how they must behave. Then it will be an epitome of all the wisdom presented by the various branches of knowledge, and a guide to the development of all the plastic arts.<sup>74</sup> The Indian approach does contradict Aristotle's *Poetics*, but not the method followed by Aristotle in his other works. Bharata states that drama has taken delivery from *Rigveda*, music from *Sāma Veda*, acting from *Tajur Veda*, and *Rasa* from *Atharva Veda*.<sup>75</sup> That is, though a drama may claim an autonomous existence, it cannot run away from the heritage of the dramatist. Any work of art can exist only as an integral element of the living culture of the land. This is the concept of tradition which the Indian aesthetician accepts as valid. But the tradition refers only to a certain group of works and actions.

Aristotle was on a more sound ground when he gave his own meaning to the term "pleasure". "If a man behaves like the Boor in comedy and turns his back on every pleasure, he will find his sensibilities becoming blunted".<sup>76</sup> Pleasure is linked with sensibility, and sensibility is closely related to the intellectual, emotional and ethical attitudes of the speaker. This is apparent when we consider Shelly's "Ode to the West Wind" or Keats' "Ode to Nightingale". The pleasure we get from such poems is not merely sensuous, for it is preceded and succeeded by an intellectual activity. Moreover, pleasure in the context of fine art is one of the misleading terms. Let us look at Aristotle: "Pleasure is a movement, a movement by which the whole soul is consciously brought into its normal state of being; and pain is the opposite".<sup>77</sup> That is, according to Aristotle, pleasure is not a mere physiological state, for it involves, as Coleridge would say, "the whole soul of man". At the same time there is an element of spontaneity in the experience.<sup>78</sup> "That is pleasant which is not forced on us".<sup>78</sup> Such a pleasure is found in great lyric poetry from Sappho down to the present day.

Learning gives rise to the best kind of pleasure, according to Aristotle. We have derivative pleasures arising from imitation, from observing imitation, from any particular recognition, from any reflective understanding, from examining the form or technique, and from grasping the nature and value of the medium employed. What kind of learning do we get from lyric poetry? Most lyric poetry acquaints us with the emotions and feelings of the poet. These are the reactions of the poet to a given situation or environment. The confessional lyric of Coleridge gives us a wealth of information about the attitudes and relations of the poet to the world outside. The lyrics of Stevens are only intellectual deriving from his meditative and contemplative attitudes. The lyrics of Whitman tell us more about the poet and his world. In this light can we say that the end of poetry is an experience of pleasure? The aestheticians, who are more interested in theory and who generally have little interest in the works of art, speak of beauty as the end of poetry. This juxtaposition of pleasure and beauty raises serious questions about the end of art.

The end aimed at by the poet is not only pleasure, but beauty. At the same time the poet does express a knowledge for the sake of a certain kind of human activity. "Activities", says Aristotle, "are what give life its character."<sup>79</sup> This is in line with Aristotle's emphasis on action, or, what Arnold called, the excellent action. But what is an excellent action is determined more by its causes and consequences.

Poetry being a product has a value in itself which is independent of the character and motives of the agents who may have brought it into being. As Aristotle puts it, "the final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is".<sup>80</sup> Such a statement, interpreted in the light of the philosophical system of Aristotle, does not support a formalistic theory or even Olson's formistic theory. Though Aristotle accepts the autonomous status of fine art he does speak of fine art as intimately bound up with life and culture. On this point the Neo-humanists like Bablitt are more faithful to the master's method than a Chicagoan dogmatist like Olson.

Any poem, says Aristotle, gives the pleasure *proper* to it. The word *proper* has misled many critics. Pleasure is not a movement or a process for "it accompanies the activity of a sense organ that is in sound and excellent condition. It completes the activity, supervening like the bloom of youth on those in the flower of their age".<sup>81</sup> Pleasure is the end product of a process, and the process need not be pleasant. It is a consequence of an activity that may even be painful. Aristotle as a shrewd thinker does not attribute any pure pleasure to the work of art; nor

does he speak of pleasure as an activity emerging from a work of art. "Pleasures are not processes nor do they all involve process—they are activities and end"<sup>82</sup> in rest, not in movement. Pleasure is a kind of stasis emerging at the conclusion of a process. This process, as we find from witnessing a tragedy or from a reading of the lyrics of complaint or melancholy, is not an unmixed one. Shelley was probably nearer the truth when he spoke of the element of sorrow present in the highest experience of pleasure. One may have a pure pleasure in the contemplation of the divine. But even then the mystics did go through the dark night of the soul.

"There are actually no pleasures that involve no pain".<sup>83</sup> The pleasure proper to the kind of poem we go through does have a disturbing element. In other words, we find Aristotle rejecting the so-called poems of pure joy. Such poems possibly express the energy of the animal spirits, and this is not what we seek in lyric poetry. Further, Aristotle declares; "As pleasant things differ, so do the pleasures arising from them".<sup>84</sup> The pleasure proper to a work of art is determined by the nature of the object imitated and by the nature of the product. It cannot be the pleasure derived only from the excellence of the imitation, for the pleasure that art offers must also be a variety of goodness"; that is, "the chief good would be same pleasure".<sup>85</sup> When an activity is impeded there can be no pleasure.

Aristotle's views on pleasure have been so badly interpreted as to give rise to a pure formalistic approach to the problem. Such an attitude arises from a misinterpretation of Aristotle. Pleasure is one of the ends of mimesis. When we are told that each work of art gives rise to a pleasure proper to it, Aristotle reminds us of the existence of higher and lower pleasures. The lower ones arise from pastimes and recreation.<sup>86</sup> Among the higher pleasures is one evoked by art and this is associated with wisdom<sup>87</sup> because it is more autonomous. The higher pleasure that art offers is the pleasure experienced by the cultured audience. Such a pleasure is bound up with intellectual and ethical values which cannot be ignored in any evaluation of a work of art. The poem has a structure which makes it unique and which presents a meaning. That is, in being a thing made, the structure becomes a thing of meaning.<sup>88</sup> Does a work of art give rise to pleasure because of its form or because of other factors?

The form of a work does contribute to pleasure. But it is not the whole story. Otherwise all the sonnets of Shakespeare must give rise to identical pleasures. That this is contrary to experience is proved by sonnet 64 dealing with mutability. Moreover, mere form by itself is only a skeleton, and it is not a work of art. It becomes a work of art only when it presents a content in a certain way. Then

the pleasure arising from a work of art is intimately bound up with our intellect, emotions, and imagination. That is, we cannot argue in favour of a pure or formal pleasure. Aristotle knew about it, even if the Neo-Aristotelians chose to ignore it.

In lyric poetry the end called pleasure depends to some extent on its musical quality. By the word "musical" is meant one who "has turned himself with the fairest harmony, not that of a lyre or other entertaining instrument, but has made a true concord of his own life between his words and his deeds...in the Dorian mode, which is the sole Hellenic Harmony".<sup>89</sup> The Dorian is said to have a manly, stately character ; the Ionian is more passionate and contentious, while the Phrygian and Lydian are foreign modes. In the Dorian harmony there is an exact correspondence of words to deeds.<sup>90</sup>

The several kinds and patterns of music are hymns, laments, dithyrambs dealing with the birth of Dionysus, and nomes. "A frantic and unhallowed lust for pleasure" brought about the degeneration of music ; and the musicians "imitated the strains of the flute on the harp, and created an universal confusion of forms".<sup>91</sup>

Music, said Plato, imitates character through sound. But "sounds are harmonised not by measure, but by skilful conjecture. The music of the flute always tries to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is, therefore, mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little which is certain".<sup>92</sup> Good music can be properly evaluated "when we know what object is reproduced, how correctly it is rendered, and how well a given representation has been effected, in point of language, melody, or rhythm". The last one refers to the hearers and critics.<sup>93</sup> Music is integral to all lyric poetry and it is made up of words, modes, and rhythm.<sup>94</sup> It must correspond to the nature of the character singing. Rhythm, melody, and diction are present in music. "Order in movement is called *rhythm*, order in articulation—the blending of acute with grave *pitch*, and the name for the combination of the two is choric art".<sup>95</sup> The mode is the manner of expressing words, and expression depends on rhythm. Such music must retain "its likeness to the model of the noble", when alone can it be right music, not merely a pleasing one. This likeness refers to the "reproduction of proportions and quality of the original". Rhythm and figure should not be divorced from melody, nor should melody and rhythm be separated from words. "Any tune is correct if it has the proper constituents, incorrect if it has unsuitable ones".<sup>96</sup>

Plato was clearer when he declared : "all the good epic poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as inspired and possessed, and the good lyric poets likewise; just as the Corybantian worshippers do not dance when in their senses,

but when they have started on the melody and rhythm they begin to be frantic, and it is under possession—as the bacchants are possessed, and not in their senses, when they draw honey and milk from the rivers—that the soul of the lyric poets does the same thing, by their own report”.<sup>97</sup> Wild music and frenzied dancing of the priests of Kybele of Rhea are referred to here.

Aristotle states that though music is neither necessary nor useful, it is “a source of intellectual culture in leisure hours”. It is a “part of that culture to which men think a freeman should devote himself.”<sup>98</sup> He quotes Homer to show that “the bard would delight them all”.<sup>99</sup> Music is a “liberal and noble” art. Music can be regarded “as a source of amusement and relaxation, or as conducive to moral virtue, or as contributing to the enjoyment of leisure and to the cultivation of our minds”. Since music is a part of learning, it cannot be viewed as an amusement. The second alternative is not acceptable because one can learn moral virtue by listening to music, not merely by cultivating it. The third alternative also is rejected on the same grounds. Yet music is connected with all the three alternatives : character—building, amusement, and cultivation of the mind. As Musaeus says, “song is to mortals of all things the sweetest”. Music offers relaxation and alleviates the consequences of past toil.<sup>100</sup>

Nature operating on contraries brings about harmony.<sup>101</sup> This harmony is the specific feature of the soul, and also of music. We are drawn towards music because of this affinity, and through rhythm music acts on us. “As we listen to rhythm and melody, our souls experience a real change”. Since this influence has a reference to change, it involves the intellect and ethos. Music has an influence on our characters and souls. “Rhythm and melody above all else provide imitations of anger and calm, of courage and temperance and their contraries, as well as of other spiritual affections, which come very near to the affections themselves”.<sup>102</sup> Even Aristotle appears to agree with Plato on the ethical standards involved in the problem : “The human soul appears to have a kind of affinity to musical modes and rhythms, whence some philosophers maintain that the soul is a harmony, others that it possesses harmony”.<sup>103</sup> As Damon said, noble souls are produced by noble song and the vulgar by vulgar.<sup>104</sup>

Aristotle is clearer when he stated that while “shapes and colours are indications rather than representations of ethical states” musical compositions — “are clearly imitations of character”.<sup>105</sup> The musical modes on which the lyric depends do depend on ethical and emotive considerations to a large extent. Some of the musical modes like the Mixolydian “make us sad and solemn”, the softer ones like the Ionian and the Lydian “enervate the mind”. The Dorian “gives rise to a moderate and settled state of mind”; and “the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm”.



Similarly some kinds of rhythm "induce restfulness, others excitement".<sup>106</sup> Music has an impact on emotions, on sensations, and on the important ethical mores. Melody and rhythm produce music.<sup>107</sup> Some melodies express character, some rouse to action and other produce inspiration, according to certain philosophers. The advantages of the study of music are education, katharsis or release of emotion, cultivation of the mind, recreation and relief from the pressure of work. "Those which best express character are the best for education", and the others can be admitted only when performed before an audience. "Emotions such as pity and fear, and even inspiration, while predominant in some soul, are found to a greater or less extent in all. Certain persons are particularly liable to feel themselves possessed by some kind of inspiration. We find that such persons are affected by religious melodies : When they hear those which fill the soul with religious excitement they are brought back to normal as if they had received medical treatment and katharsis. Men who are subject to pity or fear, and indeed all emotional people, experience the same kind of effect", when the emotions are evoked by the appropriate melodies. This holds good of all persons who are susceptible of feeling. "All, therefore, will be in some way purged and restored to the delights of tranquility. Kathartic melodies, incidentally, are likewise a source of harmless enjoyment to mankind".<sup>108</sup>

Music involves wind instruments, and we find Aristotle paying attention to this. The flute "is an instrument expressive not of moral character, but rather of orgiastic states; it is best used on those occasions when performance is intended not so much to instruct as to release emotion".<sup>109</sup>

Here Aristotle's approach has serious quarrels with Plato's doctrine. As Platonists we have to consider his views seriously. Plato's Socrates rejected the flute, but retained the Phrygian and Dorian modes.<sup>11</sup> Frenzy and similar emotions are expressed adequately only by the flute and they "are better set to the Phrygian". The dithyramb is a Phrygian melody. The Dorian is "the most solemn and studiest of modes", and it "stands midway between the other modes",<sup>111</sup> probably because it expressed the manly vigour being sober and intense. The Aeolian music is ostentatious and turgid and it does not reveal any affection because it is serious. Yet all lyric poetry should and does depend on music. Some of the so-called lyrics that are not musical are to be rejected from the lyric genre.

The primal source of all the fine arts is music, says the *Vishnu Dharmottara*.<sup>112</sup> Without music a lyric is an impossibility. If we have odes, sonnets, elegies and the like that are not musical, they are not lyrics and we exclude them from our purview in this treatise. Of the modes or musical vibrations (*śrutis*) *Chandovati* is

said to express or suggest the peace of mind, heroism, and generosity ; *Raudri* expresses wrath, warmth, and enthusiasm ; *Kumudvati* renders simplicity and gaiety ; *Sāndīpani* kindles love and affection ; *Gāndhāra* indicates hardness, determination, wrath and the like : *Pancama* suggests lust. These and other modes are found in the voices of the birds and animals also. The *śrutis* are the components of the *rāgas*, and the *rāga* is, as it were, the soul of music. *Śruti* forms specific *svaras* or notes, and the fusion of the *svaras* gives rise to a *rāga*. *Śrutis* manifest the *svaras*. The seven *svaras* evoke different emotions. The emotion is rendered determinate when these *svaras* assume the form of a specific *rāga*. The *rāga* has an audible form which the musician-painter rendered in their paintings. Śārangdeva<sup>113</sup> speaks of the various colours of the *svaras*, as Bharata attributed colours to the *rasas*.<sup>114</sup>

Pleasure may arise from a variety of reasons. The beauty of the poetic form is one source. But to say that distinctive forms evoke peculiar pleasures because they have peculiar beauties<sup>115</sup>, is to take up a very narrow view which even Aristotle refused to accept. Olson appears to be eager to distinguish his view from that of the Neo-Classicists : and in the bargain he does not mind sacrificing Aristotle at the altar of Hume. Olson's approach ignores the part played by the emotions and feelings evoked by the work of art. The pleasure arising from a work of art is a result of the emotions awakened in us by the object imitated, and by "such embellishments as rhythm, ornamental language and in general any such development of the parts as is naturally pleasing".<sup>116</sup> This is partly true. But to say that the pleasure evoked by a poem is solely dependant on these alone is to fall into a trap. If these formal embellishments alone are enough, some of the nonsense verses have to be treated as great works of art. Does the value of "Ode to the West Wind" depend on the mere presence of the embellishments ? Are we to ignore the way the meaning develops in the poem ?

"When poems of any sort, didactic no less than mimetic, are well made, pleasure is bound to result, the peculiar quality of which, in any mimetic poem is a sign of its form".<sup>117</sup> This does not mean, says Crane, that the function of poetry is to produce pleasure. Yet every kind of poetry, says Aristotle, affords its own pleasure *Hēdonēn tēn oikeian*.<sup>118</sup> Is this pleasure derived from the inner structure of the poem ? Clearly any kind of pleasure owes its being to the total experience of the poem.

The poet says something through the specific character of the language employed. This linguistic construct is a whole whose parts are internally related. In other words, the poem fulfils its function through its content also. But the peculiar emotional effect of the poem cannot be explained by merely analysing

its structure. If we do so, Neo-Aristotelianism will become a formalistic school. As Jaeger puts it : "In Aristotle's teleology substance and end are one, and the highest end is the most determinate reality there is".<sup>119</sup> That is, a neo-Aristotelian like Olson is not fair to the Aristotelian principles and methodology. The final end of a work of art cannot be abstracted from its content.

Literature, like the other fine arts, evokes emotions which play an intensive role in lyric poetry. "The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear, and the like, with their opposites". Here particular attention has to be paid to the state of mind of the speaker under the influence of an emotion, the persons or objects that evoke the emotion, and the grounds that bring about this emotion.<sup>120</sup> "The images called up cause pleasure" which follows the emotion experienced.<sup>121</sup> Aristotle analyses anger, calmness, friendship and enmity, fear, shame and shamelessness, kindness and unkindness, pity, indignation, envy and emulation following the method outlined by him. But Aristotle was aware of the fact that what counts is also the manner of expression.

Lyric poetry should not only express something, but it should reveal the manner by which it is expressed. The manner refers to the style and also to the mode of delivery. We can apply here the observations made by Aristotle in a different context : "It is, essentially, a matter of the right management of the voice to express the various emotions". The voice has to be determined by the "volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm".<sup>122</sup>

Here Aristotle follows Plato who stated : "The seasons and all the beauties of our world arise by mixture of the infinite with the finite".<sup>123</sup> It is not merely the content that Plato emphasised, but the manner of the statement. This is clear from his statement that "measure and proportion are every where identified with beauty and virtue".<sup>124</sup>

The emotions aroused by a good poem should be compatible psychologically, and they should enable us to form attachments. When alone can a good poem offer us "a high order of distinctive pleasures".<sup>125</sup> Pleasure is a state of the soul<sup>126</sup> and Aristotle's psychology does not ignore the rational aspect of the soul. That is why Aristotle warns us not to be misled by the voice of the siren. As he says : "When pleasure is at the bar the jury is not impartial. So it will be best for us if we feel towards her as the Trojan elders felt towards Helen, and regularly apply their words to her. If we are for packing her off, as they were with Helen, we shall be the less likely to go wrong".<sup>127</sup> Pleasure is taken to be a siren who misleads man.<sup>128</sup> That is, when Aristotle speaks of the pleasure proper to a given poem, he is implicitly warning us against a non-rational pleasure. The pleasure given by the form of a work of art is not purely a rational

one : for as the passage implies, there is a sensuous pleasure which cannot be treated as the ultimate end of poetry.

Lyric poetry fulfils its function by evoking certain emotions and feelings which are developed round an idea or an image. It may be that the function of a lyric depends on the objects imitated or on the devices of presentation. In the later case, the lyric cannot be a great work of art, for the devices are those that even a child can manipulate. Moreover, Aristotle does not treat the medium as an independent entity but as one inherently related to the object and the manner. It is in this context that we find Aristotle observing : "The most valuable work of art is that which is great and beautiful — for the contemplation of such a work inspires admiration, and so does magnificence — which involves magnitude".<sup>129</sup> This holds good of all great lyric poetry. But Simonides composed his ode with a definite intention of assailing and abasing the maxim of Pithakus.<sup>130</sup> Still we can conclude with Plato that the cultivation of rhythms and scales contributes to the development of gentleness ; and that "the whole of man's life requires the graces of rhythm and harmony".<sup>131</sup> This only lyric poetry can provide.

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## **DARU BRAHMA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRITUAL COMMON-ISM**

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Indian culture seems to have reached its culmination in Jagannātha culture, and Jagannātha consciousness is the foundation of this Jagannātha cult. But what is this Jagannātha consciousness ? This consciousness is the greatest contribution of Indian culture to the world at large and it won't be an exaggeration to state that this is the noblest manifestation of human culture. This consciousness is so all-pervading that it has the capacity to provide nourishment and happiness to all levels of human existence — rich or poor, king or beggar, wise or foolish, learned or ignorant, sinner or virtuous, female or male, well-bred or ill-bred, foreigner or a country man. Exactly for this reason Upendrabhanja, the great Oriya poet, in describing Sriksetra, the place of Lord Jagannātha, has justifiably obliterated the distinction between the sinner and the sacred under the banner of Lord Jagannātha.<sup>1</sup>

In Jagannātha consciousness there is no sin, no evil, nor is there any abasement on account of the same ; there is simply an unparalleled pervasiveness here in which human soul gets supreme satisfaction and finds salvation here and now. Not only that. The wise find a personified and a successful manifestation of the Vedantic ultimate 'Brahman' in Jagannātha. In his eyes Jagannātha is that ultimate reality about which the Upanisads, the pinnacle of all *śrutis*, tirelessly sing.<sup>2</sup> Jagannātha, it may be said, is devoid of sense organs and yet there are apparently all perceptual qualities in Him.<sup>3</sup> 'He hears and yet has no ears', 'he walks and has no legs'<sup>4</sup> or in the words of Goswamiji, 'He walks without legs, hears without ears',<sup>5</sup> as it were.

But is it not a fact that Jagannātha is endowed with very big eyes, those famous round eyes enticing the devotees throughout the ages ? How can He in that case be said to be devoid of sense organs ? But are they the eyes of Jagannātha ? Are we sure that we are not imposing our own thoughts on a

nebulous figure ? And this nebulous form itself has provided men throughout the ages with a fertile ground for all sorts of fanciful speculation of which human mind is capable. Jagannātha's significance seems to lie in the fact that it is a successful attempt in the form of an image to express the Reality of the Upanisads which is both *nirguṇa* and *saguṇa* and in whom the salvation of mankind rests. Jagannātha of course may have nothing to do with the Vedas and Upanisads ; even Sāyaṇācārya's explicit reference to Purusottama in his commentary on R̥gveda,<sup>6</sup> (10.155.3) does not conclusively prove that Jagannātha was Vedic God, and Sri Caitanya's reference to him as one who is sung by the Upanisads may well be set aside as simply the admiration of a devotee proving nothing whatsoever. It may be the fact that the aboriginal who at first constructed this image and worshipped it was not aware of any such significance. As Plamenatz, Professor of Social and Political theory of Oxford, has aptly pointed out in another context, "In primitive societies, men can perhaps do without a systematic philosophy just as they can do without a dogmatic religion. In the eyes of a sophisticated student of a primitive society, the customs and beliefs belonging to it may form a coherent whole ; he may see how they fit together to make it the peaceful and contented society which it is. But in the eyes of the primitive man, they are not a coherent but a familiar whole ; he does not see how they fit together".<sup>7</sup> A mere historical survey therefore cannot be adequate in this context and here I am not concerned with any such historical or genetic enquiry. The more important question for me is, what is there in Jagannātha which satisfies the demands of millions of souls ? What is it that makes Jagannātha a source of inspiration throughout the ages ? Until and unless we unravel this mystery and pinpoint it our mind cannot be set at rest only with bare historical information, in any case not with wild historical speculations about a hoary past. We must see that we are not carried away by our imaginative faculties, and stick to the facts as closely as possible. When we come to pinpoint that significance of this cult which has sustained it throughout the ages as a source of inspiration, it seems to lie in the fact that Jagannātha is a unique expression of the Vedantic Reality which is formless having form as it were. To say that the form of Jagannātha is abnormal is to miss a very significant point that it has proved its capacity to express the formless in a way which is unique in the history of mankind. It is no wonder that Jagannātha being the expression of such a Reality has proved himself capable of fulfilling the aspirations of varieties of races and cults throughout the ages. And this also explains how diverse, antagonistic, and mutually contradictory theories are built and flourishing side by side in connection with the same Deity Jagannātha culture has no antagonism towards and is not opposed to any religion,

caste or creed just as the Vedāntic culture of India based on the conception of Brahman as both *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* is naturally disposed towards contending speculative metaphysical systems and religious dogmas.

Jagannātha is thus the symbolic representation, so to say, of the mystical and paradoxical philosophy of the Upanisads.<sup>8</sup> It is significant that the mysterious entity which is supposed to be hidden inside the image and transferred at the time of Navakalevara from the old to the new image is called *Brahma* and Jagannatha is well-known as *Dāru Brahma*. And yet this is not all that is there to it. There is here a curious mixture, a strange amalgamation of the sacred and the profane, the unfamiliar and the familiar, the philosophical and the secular, and this also partly explains the mysterious attraction this culture has for the massmind, the laity. Look at the profuse pourings of abusive words on Jagannātha by His devotees. The devotee gets a supreme satisfaction and ultimate peace in sometimes addressing him as *Kālasarpa* (the great serpent in the form of time) and at others scolding him as follows: "O black faced Jagā, why have you made me so wretched?" The pomp and grandeur of Jagannatha are beyond comparison when the Lord of the three worlds ascends the car. He is an aristocrat *par excellence*, the king of kings, and yet the same Lord cannot escape the red eyes of his wife like ordinary people. Being angry, Mahalakshmi, the queen of the great ruler of the three worlds, herself breaks a part of his car. She bolts the main entrance of the great temple from inside and in order to pacify the anger of the beloved wife the Lord has to approach and request in all sorts of flattering terms. Moreover, Jagannatha has to undergo physical suffering like ordinary human beings. At the time of '*Anavasara*' he takes rest and lives on prescribed diet. The most astonishing fact is that the Lord also needs reincarnation. The embodied gives up the old body and accepts a new one as one throws away the torn cloth and takes a new one. Jagannātha is also not free from transmigration as depicted above in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. It is for this that in spite of being the ultimate Brahman Jagannatha is as if one from amongst us — very near and dear one — the most intimate of all. He is beyond our reach and yet very near to us — '*dūrastham cāntikecata*'.

None, may he be a *Dāsiābāuri* the poorest of the poor, a *Balarām Das* the infatuated, or a *Sālabega* the muslim, has been left out from this Jagannatha consciousness. Where is the place for these differences in this consciousness? And it may be taken for granted that where there is Jagannātha consciousness there no differences of caste, creed and colour can exist. We witness the highest manifestation of humanism in this consciousness when we find that the Lord of the discredited, downtrodden, fallen and proletariat descend from his throne to bear the burden of quenching the thirst and hunger of Jajpurifriend who spent the



whole night in hunger near the drain flowing from his kitchen. This is how the story runs, the anecdote is built up throughout the ages, and what are these but the manifestation of a unique consciousness, the Jagannāth consciousness ?

“Natvāham kāmāye rājyam na svargam nāpunarbhavam  
Kāmāye dukhataptānām prāṇināmārti nāsanam”

( I do not aspire for the happiness of kingdom or heaven or salvation. I only pine for the cessation of suffering of all the suffering creatures.)

‘Dhika se samsara pravalara yahin savu kathare suyoga, durvalara yahin lalaṭa lekhana nirave lanccana bhoga.’<sup>9</sup> (Fie on this world where the strong alone gets all the chances, all the opportunities and the weak has no other alternative but to bear his misfortunes in silence.) There is no doubt that this saying of Rādhānātha reflects the true state of affair as it obtains in this world of the mighty and the strong. Jagannātha culture however presents what may be regarded as a sort of spiritual common-ism before the entire human race where the weakest individual of the society may be able to enjoy an equal right to exist. Spiritualism is usually connected with something sacred, something holy, something uncommon. But here is a form of spiritualism which is of the common and for the common. As is well known, the lowliest of the low even is not deprived of the *Mahāprasāda*. Being enveloped and swayed away by this Jagannātha consciousness Goddess Mahālakṣmī does not mind the insults and humiliations, she had to suffer at the hands of the ignorant on account of the fact that she had come down to the cottage of the untouchable Caṇḍāla lady. And at last this unique ideology of spiritual common-ism has been successful in finding its footing even in the heart of its great antagonist, Balarāma. Casting away the false sense of prestige and aristocracy, Lord Balarāma has understood the significance of Jagannātha consciousness and has identified himself with its ideology of spiritual commonism. “Muhin Caṇḍāluṇi yeve ṭekidevi anna, bhojana kariva teve kīliyanjana”<sup>10</sup> (Only when I, who has been accused as a Caṇḍāla lady, would cook and hand over the food to you then only you will have your meals, O Lord), this was the declaration of the Jagannātha consciousness-intoxicated Lakṣmī and at last the victory was on the side of Jagannātha consciousness and of the common-istic ideal. Being unable to stand the burning hunger the Lords of the three worlds are forced to take the food cooked and served by Mahālakṣmī, then assuming the role of a downcast woman. The false senses of vanity, prestige and aristocracy are shattered to pieces.

“Suna he mānuṣ bhāi, savāra upare mānuṣ satya” (Listen, O man, there is none greater than man, man is the highest truth), the idea contained in these words flowing from the lips of the poet has found its culmination in Jagannātha

religion, culture and consciousness. The differences and conflicts between man and man are antagonistic to human existence and that is why they do not picture at all in Jagannātha culture. The Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest might be correct according to the laws of nature but the motto for Jagannātha culture is, to put it in the words of Anukul Chandra, in another context, "Make the unfit fit and then alone shall we all survive".<sup>11</sup> This is the unerring message of the Jagannātha cult to the so-called reputed, qualified, powerful, rich, wise and prestigious aristocrats of the society. It is to be kept in mind that a culture which neglects the unfit, a religion that hates the sinner, a consciousness that keeps one man away from another is far away from the main stream of Jagannātha culture, religion or consciousness.

The prince of Ayodhyā runs to be the guest in the cottage of a Śavara woman to eat her tested fruit, the Lord of Dwārakā snatches away the fried rice from the Brahmin Dāmodara—the poorest of the poor—and relishes it much more than the palatable dishes cooked by Mahālakṣmī herself, who again showers her love on a down cast woman being pleased by her purity. And the Lord to whom all kinds of worship are offered on the great throne hankers for a cocuanut only of an ordinary, *Dāsiābāuri*. It is because He is actually the Lord of the lowliest, the downtrodden in the garb of the king of kings. 'Ordinary'? Who is actually 'ordinary'? and why at all is he ordinary? Is it only because he is untouchable, some one very insignificant amid the countless millions? May be that he is ordinary in our level of thought, but where is the difference between ordinary and extraordinary in Jagannātha consciousness? The extraordinary is so only because of the ordinary, otherwise where lies its extraordinariness? And what is that extraordinariness? This, what I would say a form of spiritual common-ism, is what constitutes one of the most pervasive feature of the Indian culture in general and the Jagannātha consciousness in particular. It is to be borne in mind that future of human race depends on the propagation of this commonistic philosophy throughout the world and it is the responsibility of each one of us, whether individual or institution, who is an ardent lover of Jagannātha culture.

But it is to be remembered that a thousand words of appreciation that comes out of a mere emotional upsurge cannot fulfil this huge responsibility. Rather it runs counter to Jagannātha consciousness to merely go on talking boastfully about its greatness, as by this it only becomes possible on our part to satisfy our ego in establishing ourselves as the representatives of a great culture. Jagannātha consciousness points to a lifestream where there is no scope for the distinctive feature of even the smallest, the poorest and the most ordinary being lost sight of. Jagannātha culture will continue to remain as mere talk so long as this extra-

ordinariness has not been manifested in the daily life of the laity and as long as it has not become a part and parcel of our social milieu to give the legitimate recognition to the 'uncommon' in the 'common'. The highest manifestation of the Indian culture is still miles away from the Indian life and human consciousness. Its manifestation is waiting for the dedication and sacrifice of these individual and organisations who have pinned down their deepest faith in this culture and consciousness.

Be it an individual or a nation, one can hardly do without a practical philosophy to steer his course and guide his conduct. Even if this practical philosophy may not be rooted in mysticism or spiritualism or any such 'ism' of metaphysics in future, it is very important to have and perpetuate the right type of ideology at the right time. Jagannath culture is rooted in commonistic philosophy which seems to be the ideology capturing the imagination of the world today and it is also very likely to hold sway over the world to come. Hence Jagannath consciousness will continue to be adored and cherished in our hearts so long as this commonistic thought holds sway over us. Spiritual mysticism may not have a significant place in the conceptual framework of pragmatic commercialism which seems to be the moving force of the contemporary world. But it also is an undeniable fact that commonistic thought is the thought of to-day and it is very likely to influence the future course of events of the world. So long as a practical form of commonism, making common place, the secularisation so to say, of the so called sacred, spiritual or the pure is going to attract and guide the man of today and tomorrow, we can rest assured that the message of Jagannatha culture or Jagannatha consciousness will never be dead to us.

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## ARISTOTLE AND FREUD ON ART

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It is a critical commonplace that Aristotle and Freud present quite distinct accounts of art. And indeed there are important methodological differences between the teleological framework of the former and the causal orientation of the latter. Emphasizing such differences, however, tends to mask important similarities in the content of their theories, in particular the central role of the concepts of pleasure, imitation and knowledge in both accounts. In this paper we provide interpretations of both theories and argue that their content is remarkably similar. We begin, in section I, by briefly calling attention to certain important features of Aristotle's general account of art. The lengthier section II elucidates Freud's theory of art and draws detailed parallels with Aristotle's account. Section III develops our analogy with respect to the artistic species of tragedy, a central art form for both writers. We offer an interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of catharsis that points up its close kinship to Freud's account of tragic pleasure.

### I. Aristotle on Art :

Aristotle starts the *Poetics* with the claim that all the arts, including music, are modes of imitation, and he goes on to assert that the objects imitated are humans in action (1448a1).<sup>1</sup> It is not solely the external or behavioral dimension of human actions that art imitates, but, as Aristotle puts it, "character, emotion, and action" (1447a28) ; art imitates the inner motivational factors of human action as well as the overt dimension. Furthermore, unlike the historian, who is concerned with particular events and actions, the artist "tends to express the universal...how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity" (1451b6-8). And, whereas the historian merely mentions facts that have actually happened, the artist relates what may happen (1451a37-9); he focuses on situations that are possible irrespective of whether they have actually

occurred. The artist may make use of historical events, for "what has happened is manifestly possible" (1451b18), but if he does he abstracts what is typical or universal from the accidents of place and time. Assuming certain types of humans in a certain type of context, the artist traces out the probable or necessary course of events.

Now if the arts imitate the inner motives and behavioral dimension of human actions, and if they capture what is universal in such actions, then they essentially represent psychological laws. Aristotle stresses that tragedy, for example, imitates human actions, but "an action implies personal agents, who necessarily possess certain distinctive qualities both of character and thought; for it is by these that we qualify actions themselves, and these — thought and character — are the two natural causes from which actions spring" (1449b37-1450a4). A drama represents human actions as the necessary or probable outcome of thought and character. In representing the actions of a number of interacting individuals, the global events of the play are structured. Thus, in focusing on actions and their motivational basis, in stressing that the arts imitate universals of human action, so that, for example, a tragic plot unfolds with necessity or probability, Aristotle is claiming that the arts essentially involve psychological laws.

It follows that there are basic similarities in the activities of scientists and artists. The psychologist abstracts laws from actual human behavior, but such laws do not simply apply to what has happened, they are subjunctive in form. The scientific law "All As are Bs" does not merely involve the claim that the particulars which have been observed to be As are Bs, but also that if one *were* to encounter another A (even though one may never actually encounter it), then it *would* also be a B. Similarly, the artist does not imitate the accidents of what has actually happened; he abstracts a subjunctive psychological law (a universal) from actual human actions. Unlike the scientist, however, the artist places this universal in a hypothetical context. The artist is free to set this context. He assumes certain things about a type of situation and about the type of persons involved, and within that hypothetical context delineates the probable or necessary course of action. Schematically: If we assume such and such type of situation (even though this may never have occurred and perhaps never will occur), and if one were to encounter in this context such and such types of human agents, then such and such types of human actions would result.

For artistic purposes, then, subjunctive psychological laws or universals are placed in a hypothetical context, but Aristotle also stresses that these laws are exemplified in a medium. From the standpoint of the scientist the medium is largely irrelevant. It is, for example, irrelevant whether a quantitative scientific

law is expressed in Arabic or Roman numerals. Media are, however, essential to the various art forms, and Aristotle builds them into his definitions of artistic species. Imitation is the genus of art, but media, such as color and shape, or language, serve to partially differentiate the species of art. Tragedy, for example, is an imitation of a human action that is "in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament" (1449b25). In art, then, the universal is not totally abstract; it is placed in a hypothetical context, but is also embodied in a medium.

This ties indirectly with Aristotle's account of the function of art. Humans imitate actions because they seek enjoyable activity and artworks provide a distinct sort of pleasure. In accordance with his emphasis on artistic media Aristotle says that humans derive pleasure from the specific media of the various sorts of imitations. For example, there is an instinctively based pleasure derivable from color itself, and harmony and rhythm are natural to man and hence pleasurable (1448b18-22). But artworks are necessarily imitations, and in virtue of that fact are also pleasurable. Aristotle claims that imitation is instinctive to humans, and that everyone naturally enjoys imitations (1448b5-10). The pleasure obtained from imitations is distinct from that derived from media and materials for he says that if one is not acquainted with the object represented in a picture, then "the pleasure will be due not to the imitation as such, but to the execution, the coloring, or some such other cause" (1448b18-20).

While he leaves unexplained the pleasure obtained from materials and media, Aristotle does provide a reason why humans naturally enjoy imitations. Experiencing an imitation is a way of coming to learn or know, and the activity of knowing is pleasurable. The artist embeds a universal law of human action in a medium, and, for Aristotle, universals, not particulars, are the objects of knowledge. The spectator can then infer the universal law from the particulars of the medium. In doing so, he gains knowledge of the universal, and knowing is a pleasurable activity. Thus, Aristotle says that "to learn gives the liveliest pleasure...the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is, that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring" (1448b13-7).

Now the direct experience of certain human actions, such as murder, arouses fear and/or pity, both of which Aristotle regards as species of pain, and hence unpleasant (*Rhetoric* 1382a20-4; 1385b13-6). But humans do obtain pleasure from the imitation of actions that normally produce pain: "Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity" (1448b11-2). He makes the same point more explicitly in the *Rhetoric*: "since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of

imitation must be pleasant — for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry — and every product of skilful imitation; this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant; for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences (“That is a so-and-so”) and thus learns something fresh” (*Rhetoric* 1371b4-10; trans. Roberts). Thus, the “liveliest” pleasure art affords is obtained *through* imitation; for example, “the pleasure which the (tragic) poet should afford is that which comes from pity and fear through imitation” (1453b13-4). Even if the action imitated would normally produce pain, inferring the universal embedded in the imitation is a form of knowing, and knowing is pleasurable.

To summarize : the arts afford what we might call “aesthetic” pleasure, derivable from the nonrepresentational properties of the various artistic media. But there is also a sort of pleasure that arises through imitation, and artworks are imitations, representations of what is universal in action and character. They capture, in a medium, laws that are essentially psychological, and thereby enable humans to procure the pleasure that attends understanding.

## II. Freud on Art :

Turning to Freud, we find it clearly stated that pleasure is the central aim of life (XXI, 76).<sup>2</sup> But the program of the pleasure principle, i.e., the direct gratification of instinctive wishes, is at loggerheads with reality. Suffering is the ultimate lot of humanity, and the best that can be hoped for in the long run, as a corollary of the pleasure principle, is the avoidance of pain. Furthermore, civilization demands that the individual sacrifice his instinctive and selfish pleasure seeking for the common good. The result is that wishes that run counter to the demands of civilization are repressed and embedded in the unconscious.

Freud views the human organism as a system which seeks to equilibrate and economize the expenditure of energy (VIII,127). The effort to repress a wish involves an accumulation of energy, which is experienced as unpleasant or painful (V,598). Since the repressed wish is in the unconscious, the individual cannot voluntarily bring it to consciousness. However, it manifests itself in consciousness in the form of a disguised substitute, e.g., a dream, neurotic symptom, joke or artwork. Manifestation of the wish is accompanied by a discharge of the bottled-up energy, an equilibration of the energy system, which is experienced as pleasurable.

Taking dreams as an example, Freud posits a dual structure : there is a latent dream content which is formed in the unconscious and is based on a repressed wish, and a manifest content, i.e., the dream as experienced. Via the psychological mechanisms of condensation, displacement, representation, and secondary revision,

which are theoretically expressible as psychological laws, the latent dream content is transformed into a manifest form in which the repressed wish is not directly recognizable. Experiencing the manifest dream involves a discharge of accumulated energy, an equilibration of the energy system, which is pleasurable. The experienced dream is thus a disguised fulfillment of a repressed wish.

Although dreams are generally innocuous, neuroses can be disabling ; yet they share essentially the same structure. A neurotic symptom is akin to a manifest dream ; it is the end product of a repressed wish that emerges by somewhat similar transformation mechanisms. Experiencing the symptom yields an immediate, albeit *temporary*, relief — a substitute satisfaction. It does not, however, completely terminate the wish that is the origin of the symptom, for the wish, embedded in the unconscious, repeatedly gives rise to the symptom. Nevertheless, for Freud the laws governing the transformation of the wish to the overt neurotic symptom are deterministic. Via these laws the psychoanalyst can start with a manifest symptom and uncover the hitherto repressed wish. Bringing the wish to consciousness entails that it is no longer repressed, and hence, there is no causal basis for the symptom ; in Freud's words : "symptoms disappear when we have made their unconscious predeterminants conscious" (XVI, 280). In accordance with the corollary of the pleasure principle, the pain attendant upon the effort to repress the wish is avoided. Through the self-knowledge fostered by psychoanalysis the person gains a measure of control over his neuroses. In doing so he gains permanent relief, for he avoids the suffering that accompanies the neuroses.

Now Freud claims that artworks are manifest products of the same sorts of instinctive but repressed wishes that generate manifest dreams and neurotic symptoms (XVI, 376 ; XX, 64-5). But dreams and neurotic symptoms are generally asocial mental products. A dream, for example, produces only private satisfaction (VIII, 179), and a neurotic symptom is repulsive. In contrast, artworks are social in nature ; they afford pleasure to the artist and are "calculated to arouse sympathetic interest in other people" (XX, 65). The artist has techniques that enable him to make his wish-phantasies enjoyable to spectators. Let us examine these techniques, for this is where the parallels with Aristotle begin to surface.

We noted Aristotle's claim that the media and materials of art can give rise to a pleasure that is distinct from the pleasure obtained from imitation. But his remarks on the pleasure obtained from color, or rhythm and harmony, are brief, and he does not explain why we find these aspects of artworks to be pleasurable. Freud also asserts that, quite apart from the sense or meaning of words, there is "the pleasurable effect of rhythm or rhyme" (VIII, 125). In general, he grants



that the formal or nonrepresentational properties of an artwork can produce what he calls "aesthetic" pleasure (IX, 153; XX, 65). In contrast to Aristotle, however, Freud provides an explanation of the function of aesthetic pleasure based on an analogy with his account of the pleasure obtained from jokes.

In studying pleasure and the genesis of jokes, Freud accepts Fechner's principle of aesthetic intensification, i.e., when distinct pleasures are combined the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (VIII, 135). Freud notes that we obtain pleasure from the syntactic or formal features of jokes, but claims that this pleasure, which he labels "fore-pleasure", is not sufficient to account for the quantity of pleasure obtained from tendentious jokes. He argues that the fore-pleasure of jokes often serves to release a greater and deeper source of pleasure from repressed wishes. Via Fechner's principle the combined yield of pleasure is greater than the two separate pleasures. Thus, Freud says that "tendentious jokes...put themselves at the service of purposes in order that, by means of using the pleasure from jokes as a fore-pleasure, they may produce new pleasure by lifting suppressions and repressions" (VIII, 137). Analogously, he claims that "all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative writer affords us has the character of a fore-pleasure of this kind" (IX, 153). The formal techniques of the artist enable us to obtain a satisfaction of instinctive wishes that would often be repulsive if they were not masked by and combined with aesthetic fore-pleasure: "the essential *ars poetica* lies in the technique of overcoming the feeling of repulsion in us...The writer bribes us by the purely formal — that is, aesthetic — yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies" (IX, 153).

Thus, both Aristotle and Freud acknowledge what we have called "aesthetic" pleasure. Both also subordinate it: Aristotle by claiming that to learn (via imitation in the case of art) gives the "liveliest" pleasure, Freud by claiming that aesthetic fore-pleasure gives rise to the greater pleasure associated with the gratification of repressed wishes.

A second technique whereby the artist can make his repressed wishes enjoyable to others involves the creation of imitations. We have noted Aristotle's account of the pleasure derived from imitation, and Freud's explanation of this pleasure, which is basically similar to Aristotle's, can be grasped if we take a closer look at his account of the psychical apparatus (V, 565-8).

Freud assumes a person is an energy system that seeks equilibration. Considered in a primitive stage of development, this system seeks to remain free of stimuli; it is structured as a reflex apparatus so that a stimulus input, and consequent build-up of energy, is discharged along a motor path. Apart from external stimuli, there are also internal somatic needs that generate an energy build-up which seeks discharge in movement. The hungry baby, for example,

kicks. His kicking, however, does not itself resolve the need, which continues until it is terminated in an experience of satisfaction. An ingredient of the typical experience of satisfaction is what Freud calls a "perception", e.g., nourishment. When the baby is nourished, a mnemonic image of this perception is then associated with a memory trace of the energy build-up produced by the need. When the need arises again the energy build-up triggers the memory trace which is associated with the mnemonic image of the perception. In this way the subject seeks to "re-evoke the perception itself, that is to say, to re-establish the situation of the original satisfaction" (V, 566). The entire "current of energy", which starts with the unpleasantly experienced build-up of energy produced by the need, and which aims at satisfaction, is the *wish*; the reappearance of the perception is the fulfilment of the wish.

The shortest path of wish-fulfilment starts with an energy build-up and terminates in the mnemonic image of the perception, in which case we have a hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. The focus is on an *image* of the situation of the original satisfaction, not the real thing. There is a temporary pleasure associated with hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, but if this primary system were the only mechanism of the psychic apparatus the organism would soon come to grief. If such hallucinating were constantly repeated it would result in a series of temporary pleasures, but, since this would not effectively terminate the need, the organism would soon exhaust itself (V, 598). Thus, Freud posits a secondary psychic system through which it becomes possible to experience a real, non-hallucinatory based satisfaction (V, 566-7). Nevertheless, the primary system is psychically fundamental, and it plays a central role in Freud's account of the pleasure obtained from artistic imitations.

An artwork is, for Freud, a "reflection of reality" (XII, 224). In one sense, an artwork, such as a picture, is a physical object. But, qua picture of, say, President Carter, it is a *reflection* or image of Carter; it is not merely physical, and, of course, it is not Carter himself. A picture of Carter, like a reflection in a mirror, may "look like" Carter, and in some cases, as with a *trompe l'oeil*, we may mistake one for the other. Thus, there is a basis for saying that a picture, as a reflection, presents an illusion of reality. Freud, in fact, often regards artworks as illusions. He says that art "does not seek to be anything but an illusion...it makes no attempt at invading the realm of reality" (XXII, 160). Furthermore, he claims that the pleasure obtained from art, apart from aesthetic fore-pleasure, is "based on an illusion" (VII, 306).

We then have an analogy: just as the unnourished baby may hallucinate nourishment, and its hallucination is based on a wish, so a spectator experiences

a reflection, an illusion, which for Freud is also based on a wish-phantasy. Both the hallucination and the artistic illusion originate, in Richard Sterba's words, "in a very early phase of psychic development at which the individual still looks upon himself as omnipotent because wishes are experienced at this period as if their fulfilment in reality were achieved by the mere act of wishing."<sup>3</sup> And an artistic illusion, as well as a hallucination, is doubly governed by the pleasure principle. The basic cause of either product, a repressed wish, is tied to the pleasure principle. Furthermore, both provide only temporary satisfaction, for the wish in either case terminates in an image that is linked with a mere substitute satisfaction of the wish.

In places, Freud indicates that, aside from aesthetic fore-pleasure, the only pleasure art affords is that akin to the pleasure attending hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. Where he draws a sharp distinction between art (= illusion) and reality, he often claims that art can, at best, yield a substitute satisfaction (XXI, 75), an imaginary satisfaction (XX, 64-5), or a "mild narcosis ... a transient withdrawal from the pressure of vital needs" (XXI, 81). But an artwork is, for Freud, not merely a reflection (= illusion) ; it is a reflection *of reality*. He explicitly states that artworks enable one to "find a path back to reality" (XI, 50 ; XVI, 376 ; XX, 64-5). The artist, like everyone else, has repressed wishes, but he "finds the way back to reality ... from this world of phantasy by making use of special gifts to mould his phantasies into truths of a new kind, which are valued by men as precious reflections of reality" (XII, 224). The reality art reflects is, for Freud as well as Aristotle, psychological. The artwork is, in Freud's words : "a faithful image of (the artist's) phantasy ... a representation of his unconscious phantasy" (XVI, 376). Thus, a repressed wish *generates* the artwork, and the artwork in turn *represents* the wish.

Furthermore, Freud maintains that the wish represented by the artwork is not uniquely the artist's, but is common to all humans.<sup>4</sup> The Oedipus complex, for example, is ubiquitous to humans, and Freud concludes from his studies of *Oedipus Rex*, *Hamlet*, *The Brothers Karamazov*, *Rosmersholm*, and *Macbeth* that these works represent "a universal law of mental life...in all its emotional significance" (XX, 63). An artwork, like a dream, is generated by repressed wishes. yet artworks differ from the "asocial, narcissistic products of dreaming in that they (are) calculated to arouse sympathetic interest in other people and (are) able to evoke and to satisfy the same unconscious wishful impulses in them too" (XX, 65). But an artwork does not merely enable the spectator, as well as the artist, to engage in hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. Since his work represents a universal psychological law, an artist can, through his work, enable all of us as spectators to "*recognize*

our own inner minds, in which those same impulses, though suppressed, are still to be found" (IV, 263, our emphasis).

As reflections of reality, then, artworks are not mere means to hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. A manifest artwork is a disguised representation of a repressed wish that is common to humanity. As such, it embeds general psychological truths about mankind. Because it captures general truths, an artwork has the potential for providing a "path back to reality", for through it the spectator may recognize a suppressed truth about himself.

Now according to Freud ; the artist's repressed wish is transformed by the mechanisms of condensation, displacement, representation, and secondary revision into a manifest artwork. The transformation laws representing these mechanisms are deterministic. Therefore, given a knowledge of psychoanalytic principles derived from the study of phenomena such as dreams, jokes, and neuroses, that is, a knowledge of repressed wishes and transformation laws, it should be possible to understand manifest artworks.<sup>5</sup> Conversely, artworks themselves can be a source of psychoanalytic knowledge. We can start with the observed artwork and, by inductive inference, gain knowledge of the repressed wishes and transformation laws.

Freud clearly maintains that psychoanalytic principles can be employed to reveal the real or deep meaning of an artwork. He claims the deep meaning of *Hamlet* was effectively concealed until revealed by psychoanalysis (VII, 310), and he provides a "deeper reason" for the attraction of the *Mona Lisa's* smile than those preferred by the standard interpretations (XI, 110). He allows that artworks are open to more than one interpretation, but claims that psychoanalysis, with its access to the "deepest layer of impulses" in the artist's mind, yields the deepest, most profound, interpretations (IV, 266).

Freud also maintains that artworks can be a source of psychoanalytic knowledge. In discussing Jensen's *Gradiva* he remarks that "creative writers are valuable allies and their evidence is to be prized highly, for they are apt to know a whole host of things between heaven and earth of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream. In their *knowledge* of the mind they are far in advance of us everyday people, for they draw upon sources which we have not yet opened up for science" (IX, 8, our emphasis). Since the repressed wish represented by an artwork is, as we have noted, common to humanity, this knowledge is universal, not particular. The artist has an instinctive or intuitive grasp of psychoanalytic laws, which he exemplifies in his works, and which can then be grasped by the spectator. Freud's primary example is Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* which "seizes on a compulsion which *everyone recognizes* because he feels its existence within himself.

Each member of the audience was once, in germ and in phantasy, just such an Oedipus" (I,265, our emphasis).

An artwork, then, exemplifies or presents "a universal law of mental life" (XX, 63) through which the spectator may uncover, and come to know, his hitherto repressed wishes. Experiencing an artwork fully is, in a sense, like undergoing psychoanalysis; the spectator, like the patient, comes to recognize his own repressed wishes. Of course, whereas the psychoanalyst has explicit knowledge of psychoanalytic laws and is able to bring the wish fully to consciousness, the artist and spectator have an intuitive, implicit grasp of those laws (IX,8-9,92; XI,165), and hence a repression may only be partially lifted by the recognition afforded by an artwork. But the effect is similar. Freud explicitly allows that recognition is pleasurable (VIII,120-2), whether it be by artistic or scientific means. When a repressed wish is partially or fully brought to consciousness pleasure is experienced, for, in accord with the corollary of the pleasure principle, the pain attendant upon the effort to repress the wish is avoided.

Artworks, then, as "reflections of reality," produce a complex form of pleasure. As *reflections* they are, like mirror images, not "real." Like the mnemonic image of a perception, an artwork arises from a repressed wish and provides a pleasure akin to that attending hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. But, as reflections of reality, artworks exemplify universal psychological laws which, when recognized by the spectator, enable him to at least partially lift the repression and avoid the pain accompanying the effort of repression. Furthermore, it is *through* the creation of an artwork qua reflection, representation, or imitation that this latter pleasure (or avoidance of pain) arises. It is the artwork that represents the repressed wish, and it is through the artwork that the wish is brought to consciousness and the repression lifted.

Thus, Freud's account of art turns out to be very similar to Aristotle's. Both acknowledge an "aesthetic" pleasure obtainable from the nonrepresentational aspects of artistic media. Both also subordinate this pleasure to that afforded by the representational or imitative dimension of art. According to Aristotle, an artwork represents a universal pattern of human action. In inferring the universal from particulars of a medium, the spectator recognizes or comes to know the universal, and knowing is the central pleasurable activity for a rational animal. For Freud, aesthetic pleasure is a species of fore pleasure that serves to release a greater source of pleasure from repressed wishes, and this latter pleasure derives from an artwork's status as an imitation or reflection. As a reflection (= illusion), an artwork provides a deep but temporary pleasure akin to that accompanying hallucinatory wishfulfilment. As a reflection of reality, however

an artwork is a disguised representation of an unconscious, repressed wish that is universal to mankind. Because it embeds a universal law, an artwork can provide a path back to reality from the domain of pure hallucination. Through it the spectator can recognize a suppressed truth about mankind in general, including himself. Recognizing the suppressed wish, coming to know it, raises it to the conscious level. Having brought the wish to consciousness, the spectator avoids the pain that accompanies the expenditure of energy necessary for repression. The recognition of psychological truths through artistic images is thus a pleasurable activity.

For both Aristotle and Freud, then, the deepest pleasure art provides is obtained *through* imitation. According to Freud, insofar as art leads one from mere hallucinatory wish-fulfilment back to reality, it must represent, or imitate in disguised form, a universal wish. It is through the artwork as a reflection of psychological reality that the wish is brought to consciousness, the repression lifted, and the accompanying pleasure experienced. For Aristotle, it is through imitation that the artist represents universals, the objects of knowledge. Art affords the pleasure of knowing in virtue of being imitative. Even if the action imitated would, in the normal context, produce pain, recognizing a psychological universal via imitation is a form of knowing, and hence pleasurable.

Since the central pleasure art affords is obtained through imitation, this holds true of the species tragedy. Indeed, it is this point, common to the theories of Aristotle and Freud, that is the key to understanding their accounts of tragedy, the central artistic genre for both theorists.

### III. Aristotle and Freud on Tragedy

Aristotle claims that a tragedy is "an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude ; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play ; in the form of action, not of narrative ; through pity and fear effecting the proper [catharsis] of these emotions" (1449b24.8). He does not elucidate "catharsis" in the *Poetics*, but in the *Politics* (1342a6-17) he says that the religious enthusiast is purged of his feelings by the sacred melodies. The music excites the person to a frenzy and enables him to give vent to his emotions, thereby returning him to a normal state and providing him with a pleasurable relief. This notion of catharsis, transferred to the *Poetics*, is the basis of the standard interpretation of the tragic catharsis. Originally advanced by Bernays, it is nicely summed up in S. H. Butcher's words : "Tragedy excites the emotions of pity and fear — kindred emotions that are in the breasts of all men — and by the act of excitation affords a pleasurable relief. The feelings called forth by the tragic spectacle are not

indeed permanently removed, but are quieted for the time, so that the system can fall back upon its normal course. The stage, in fact, provides a harmless and pleasurable outlet for instincts which demand satisfaction, and which can be indulged here more fearlessly than in real life."<sup>6</sup> There is evidence in the *Poetics* for this interpretation, since Aristotle does say that tragedy "inspires" (1453a5), and "arouses" (1453b1) fear and pity in the spectator. But in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle claims that fear and pity are species of pain. Fear is defined as a "pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future" (1382a21-2, trans. Roberts). Pity is defined as a "feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon" (1385b13-6, trans. Roberts). The difficulty, then, the tragic paradox, is how the arousal of pity and fear — both species of pain — can produce pleasure. Aristotle himself does not clarify the notion of tragic catharsis in the *Poetics*, and Butcher's claim that in tragedy the "painful element in the pity and fear of reality is purged away; the emotions themselves are purged,"<sup>7</sup> seems inconsistent. If tragedy produces fear and pity, i.e., *species* of pain, how can it purge the "painful element" in pity and fear?

On our interpretation of Aristotle, artistic imitations enable us to engage in the activity of learning or knowing, which is pleasurable. Each artistic genre aims to produce its own specific pleasure, thus "we must not demand of tragedy any and every kind of pleasure, but only that which is proper to it .. the pleasure which the [ tragic ] poet should afford is that which comes from pity and fear *through imitation*" (1553b10-3, our emphasis). As an imitation, a tragedy enables us to infer a universal concerning events that would normally arouse fear and pity. Inferring a universal from the particulars of a medium is a type of knowing, and hence is pleasurable, even if the events imitated are themselves unpleasant.

Now several classical scholars have suggested that the tragic catharsis is simply the process of inferring or learning via imitation when the events imitated are such that they would normally arouse fear and pity.<sup>8</sup> Leon Golden, for example, notes that "catharsis," in addition to signifying physical purgation or purification, can mean intellectual clarification; it is "the act of 'making clear' or the process of 'clarification' by means of which something that is intellectually obscure is made clear to an observer... The process of inference described by Aristotle 'clarifies' the nature of the individual act by providing, through the medium of art, the means of ascending from the particular event witnessed to an

understanding of its universal nature, and thus it permits us to understand the individual act more clearly and distinctly.”<sup>9</sup> Golden then suggests that the final clause of the definition of “tragedy” that Aristotle offers at 1449b24-8 in the *Poetics* should be translated as : “Tragedy is an imitation of an action... achieving, through the representation of pitiful and fearful situations, the clarification of such incidents.”<sup>10</sup> Thus, the tragic catharsis is synonymous with the process of learning or inferring that Aristotle discusses at 1448b4-20 in the *Poetics*.

There are several advantages to this interpretation of catharsis : (1) it avoids the basic inconsistency of the purgation interpretation, (2) it is consistent with Aristotle’s claim at 1449b22-3 that the definition of “tragedy” he offers is a consequence of his previous discussion, for that discussion focuses on the medium, the objects, and the manner of imitation, alongwith its aim — knowing or learning, (3) it is also consistent with Aristotle’s assertion at 1451b7 that poetry expresses the universal in human action, and (4) it is consistent with his claim at 1453b13-4 that the proper pleasure of tragedy comes from the imitation of fearful and pitiful events.

Freud offers a similar account of tragedy in his article “Psychopathic Characters on the Stage”, written in 1905-6, but never published during his lifetime. He starts the article with a comment that is in the tradition of Bernays’ purgation account of catharsis : “If, as has been assumed since the time of Aristotle, the purpose of drama is to arouse ‘terror and pity’ and so ‘to purge the emotions’, we can describe that purpose in rather more detail by saying that it is a question of opening up sources of pleasure or enjoyment in our emotional life... the prime factor is unquestionably the process of getting rid of one’s own emotions by ‘blowing off steam’; and the consequent enjoyment corresponds...to the relief produced by a thorough discharge” (VII,305).

From his subsequent discussion, however, it is clear that Freud is not claiming that tragedy arouses fear and pity in the spectator. We must remember that the pleasure connected with a wish that terminates in an artistic product, like the pleasure derived from a wish that ends in a mnemonic image of a perception, is based on an illusion. Artistic wish-fulfilment is grounded in a regression to the primary psychic system where pleasure is obtained from an illusion that substitutes for reality. The pleasure in artistic imitations, or illusions, only *corresponds*, as Freud puts it, to the pleasure one obtains from the normal non-hallucinatory gratification of a wish. Thus, Freud adds that the theater-goer’s “enjoyment is based on an illusion ; that is to say, his suffering is mitigated by the certainty that, firstly, it is someone other than himself who is acting and suffering on the stage,



and secondly, that after all it is only a game" (VII, 306). In fact, Freud adds that it is a precondition of tragedy that "it should not cause suffering to the audience, that it should know how to compensate, by means of the possible satisfactions involved, for the sympathetic suffering which is aroused" (VII, 307).

As we have previously noted, this compensation is in part obtained from the formal fore-pleasure of art, which in turn releases deeper sources of pleasure from repressed wishes via hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. But an artwork is not a mere illusion; it reflects reality, it is a disguised representation of the wish that generated it, and that wish is universal. In discussing *Hamlet*, Freud says: "The repressed impulse is one of those which are similarly repressed in all of us, and the repression of which is part and parcel of the foundation of our personal evolution...it is easy for us to recognize ourselves in the hero: we are susceptible to the same conflict as he is" (VII, 309). Similarly, we noted his claim that "everyone recognizes" the conflict in *Oedipus Rex* "because he feels its existence within himself. Each member of the audience was once, in germ and in phantasy, such an Oedipus" (I, 265). Recognizing the repressed wish, coming to know it, is pleasurable because the pain attendant upon repression of the wish is avoided.

The central similarities between Aristotle's and Freud's accounts of tragedy are thus: (1) tragedies are imitations or representations of psychological reality, (2) they embed universal psychological laws, (3) we do obtain aesthetic pleasure from the formal features of tragedies but, (4) the central pleasure tragedies afford is that which attends learning, knowing or recognizing such laws, (5) this pleasure arises through imitation; representations are enjoyable even though the actual experience of tragic events is painful, consequently, (6) neither theorist accepts the purgation theory.

Finally, it is perhaps not surprising that Freud's theory of art turns out to be a variation of a theme of Aristotle's; the continued influence of the *Poetics* over the centuries inclines us to believe that Aristotle was close to the truth about art.<sup>11</sup>

#### Notes :

1. S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, 4th ed. (New York : Dover, 1951). Butcher's translation is cited throughout this paper, and additional references are incorporated into the text.
2. Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and trans. by James Strachey (London : Hogarth, 1966). Additional references to these volumes are incorporated in the text.
3. Richard Sterba, "The Problem of Art in Freud's Writings", *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 2 (April, 1940),

p. 265. 4. The artist's repressed wish, while common to humanity, may contain egocentric and personal details. But Freud stresses that the artist "understands how to work over his daydreams, in such a way as to make them lose what is too personal about them and repels strangers" (XVI, 37). 5. Freud allows that in its present state psychoanalysis enables us to provide only a partial understanding of artworks (XI, 132), but, given his deterministic assumption, it is theoretically possible to give a more complete account. 6. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, p. 245. 7. *Ibid.*, p. 254. 8. Leon Golden, "The Purgation Theory of Catharsis," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 31, no. 4 (summer, 1973), p. 478, fn. 2. 9. Leon Golden, "Catharsis," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vol. XCIII (1962), p. 57. 10. *Ibid.*, p. 58. 11. That Freud's theory can be regarded as an extended footnote to Aristotle was first suggested to us by Professor Herbert Hochberg.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

1. S. Hom Chaudhuri, *Shakespeare Criticism : Dryden to Morgann*, S. Chand and Co., New Delhi, 1979, Octavo demy, pp. 274, Price Rs. 55-00.

“Dryden and Pope were the classics of our age of prose and reason” — that is how Arnold reacted to the works of eighteenth century writers and the statement, in spite of its notoriety, is not without its validity. While the claim of a revival of classicism was confined to the 18th century, the Elizabethans, as the author rightly claims, were also no less inspired by the ancients. If Pope and Johnson were influenced by the impeccable expression of their works, the Elizabethans imbibed their richness of material, wealth of thought and imagery. That is regarding the major trend of the two ages. But while analysing the Shakespeare criticism from Dryden to Morgann, the author explicitly suggests that the ‘age of prose and reason’ was engaged in some better business than merely putting a caesura in its right place. In fact, the Augustan concept of ‘Good Taste’ is essentially connected with the inexplicable nature of individual genius and as Addison points out in the 18th century “there was not a village in England that had not a ghost in it,..... there was scarce a shepherd to be met with who had not seen a spirit.”

The individual critics of Shakespeare are also no exception to this. Thus when Dryden as a product of 18th century speaks of low cultural milieu of Shakespeare’s age, his innate sensibilities (Shakespeare’s legacy ?) make him appreciate the most unclassical figure, Caliban. Similarly, his defence of Shakespeare’s violation of dramatic unities is seen as a step out of the prisons of neoclassical rules and restrictions. Addison, who in his work incorporates magical and supernatural within the ambit of poetry does it in a true Longinian vein and his violation of the laws of classicism is obvious when he says — “Rules, like, crutches, are a needful aid to the lame, though an impediment to the strong.” Pope, the greatest creative mind of the

age also defended Shakespeare. The passionate moments in Shakespeare's plays, individuality and life-likeness of his characters lead the author to say : "It is not just a question of his imitating her. It is rather a question of Nature projecting herself through the poet's writings." Or, as Pope himself confesses : "To judge there of Shakespeare by Aristotle's rules is like trying a man by the laws of one country, who acted under those of another." In fact, historical criticism of Shakespeare started only with Pope.

The greatest stalwarts of 18th century neo-classicism, Johnson, obviously enough, failed to discern the fine ethical values that are implicit in the texture of Shakespeare's plays. Even his Augustanism prevented him from appreciating the richness of an ambiguity in Shakespeare's language : "A quibble was to him the fatal Cleopatra for which he lost the world, and was content to lose it." On the other hand, overriding his eighteenth century predilections Johnson exhibits his fine aesthetic sensibility, calls Shakespeare's works as 'death-less' and appreciates Shakespeare's disregard of unities in unequivocal terms. His defence of Shakespeare's tragi-comedies on the ground that they exhibit the 'real state of sublunary nature' is also seen as a tremendous achievement for a neoclassical critic like Johnson. The last critic in the survey is Maurice Morgann and in him the author finds the culmination of the liberating influence of Longinus in the 18th century. Morgann's distinction between intellect and intuition, reason and imagination leads the author to call him 'an impassioned Shelley born before his time.' His deep concern with Shakespeare's Falstaff and appreciation of the wholeness and integrity of Shakespeare's characters as a whole are seen as the harbingers of romantic criticism. The author strikes a balance in his assertions. In being able to appreciate the beauty of Shakespeare in spite of the restrictions of the age, the author maintains, the English mind not only rose to the occasion, simultaneously the criticism of a great author like Shakespeare gave a new dimension to the 18th century mind and emancipated it.

-- Bhabani S. Baral

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2, Mahāpātra Śrī Viśvanātha Kavirāja, (14th c.) *Kāvyaṇṇakāśaṇḍarṇa* Ed. by Goparaju Rama, Manju Prakashan, Allahabad, 1979, 8vo demy, paper bound pp. 8+168 with a foreword by G. C. Tripathi.

That Visvanātha Kavirāja, the great author of *Sāhitya Darṇa* wrote a commentary on the famous *Kāvyaṇṇakāśa* of Mammāṇa Bhaṇṇa was only a historical fact so far. Scholars have agreed that Viśvanātha wrote it after comple-

tion of his *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, but have failed in spite of their repeated efforts to find the work out and to get it published. Although several commentaries on *Kāvyaṇṇakāṣa* have been written and published, the present work is immensely important for the fact that the author of a great critical work must have said something very important on his predecessor, who commanded over a number of critics for over centuries. It is indeed a very laudable attempt of Dr. Rama to find, edit and publish such a very monumental work of Sanskrit criticism much coveted and awaited by the scholars here and abroad who must feel obliged to him greatly now.

The writers on Sanskrit criticism have wrongly remarked that Viṣvanātha is a second-grade critic and his SD is only a text book written for talentless students who are incapable of understanding Mammaṭa, whom he has only repeated and where differed has failed substantially in his arguments. Hence by writing on Mammaṭa Viṣvanātha must have felt elevated himself instead of contributing anything substantially to either Mammaṭa or Sanskrit criticism in general. This type of cavalier criticism was needing a proper reassessment of Viṣvanātha which has been inaugurated by Professor G. C. Tripathi in his brief but brilliant Foreword to the present work. “*Darpaṇa* has the unique importance of being composed by a person whose scholarship was in no way inferior to the author of the work he commented upon. I would even rate Viṣvanātha higher than Mammaṭa since in addition to his being a scholar and a critic he was also a poet of considerable merit... he was most suitable a person to comment upon a scholarly work like *Kāvyaṇṇakāṣa*... In my opinion it is *Kāvyaṇṇakāṣa* which has gained in importance with the commentary of Viṣvanātha and it is a matter of honour for Mammaṭa to be commented upon by a scholar like Viṣvanātha.”

But this edition has also some vital errors a few of which may be pointed here. The first and foremost is the miswritten name of the author as Viṣvanātha Mohāpātra. Nowhere such name is found. Everywhere the name is Mahāpātra Viṣvanātha Kavirāja or rather more commonly Viṣvanātha Kavirāja. Even in the inaugural stanza of the present work the author writes — “Kriyate Viṣvanāthena Kavirājena dhimatā” and in the end of chapters — “iti mahāpātra sri Viṣvanātha Kavirāja kṛtau.” So also in the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*. This error should be immediately corrected. Besides, as this edition is prepared depending on one ms it is full of scribal errors. It is quite risky to arrive at definite conclusions resting on this distorted text. But however this text of *KPD* becomes clear when read with the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* and *Sāhityadarpaṇa, locana* by Ananta dāsa, the son of Viṣvanātha.

While passing the editorial remarks the present editor did not consult the texts of *SD* and *SDL*, an act resulting in rigorous critical confusions. It is wrong to say that VK mostly agrees with Mammaṭa since it is well known from the *SD* that he differs from the latter in defining poetry. In the present text (P5) he criticises Mammaṭa's definition — “na hyeṣāni adoṣavādīnām Kāvyaalakṣanamityarthah.” Viśvanātha does not endorse “citrakāvya” counted by Mammaṭa. Rather he comments (P. 9 of the text) that Mammaṭa has been swayed away by the great rhetoricians of Kasmir. As an exponent of *Dhvanī* he should not have counted it as poetry proper (“prācīnvavahāra etc.”) The debatable term “Upajīvyā” (editor's Introduction P. 7) does not refer to Mammaṭa. It positively refers to Candīdāsa who is certainly not his opponent (see text P. 27 — “teṣāmupajīvyānām” etc). It is by his work (*Kāvyaṭṭakāśadīpikā* and *Dhvanīsiddhānta saṁgraha*) that VK was inspired to write on poetics, not by Mammaṭa's works. Viśvanātha's date is also wrongly put, and though he cites only four works of his own in the present text he has written a lot more. (See my paper “Some Unknown and Little-known works of Viśvanātha Kavirāja” *Orissa Historical Research Journal* Vol VIII, 1959). He has written thirteen volumes.

All in all, to be frank in our assessment, we can emphatically state that Dr. Rama's effort in editing and publishing this invaluable work of Viśvanātha will open a new way of reassessing the celebrated author of *Sāhityadarpaṇa*.

— Banamali Rath

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3. S. N. Ghoshal Sastri, *Elements of Indian Aesthetics*, Vol. I, Chowkhamba Orientalia, Varanasi, 1978, ¼ demy, PP. xxii+242, Price : Ordinary Rs 125-00; deluxe Rs. 175-00.

Since A. K. Coomarswamy the growing interest of the scholars in Indian aesthetics has resulted in some excellent publications in the field. We may classify these works as (i) the source books or historical surveys, (ii) Comparative studies and (iii) interdisciplinary cum comparative analyses. Traditional scholars of India, who are not trained in the tradition of Western philosophy and literature, are incapable of any comparative vision. Nevertheless they render great services to the comparatists by exploring new vistas of analysis through their wide ranging and deep studies in the original Sanskrit, Pali, Prakṛt and Tibetan texts. In fact, the ‘interdisciplinary’ method of research is nothing new to the traditional

pundits of India because, as already admitted by the Western scholars, this was the very method of the studies in aesthetics and literary criticism in ancient and medieval India. They couldn't think of any literary criticism *per se* without any knowledge of metaphysics, linguistics, sociology and psychology. Hence all traditional studies in Indian aesthetics are bound to be interdisciplinary.

The present volume of Ghoshal Sastri is an excellent example of such a traditional scholarship. The author inaugurates here an ambitious scheme of three volumes, the proposed contents of the other two volumes also being attached here to. The volumes aim at an extensive and exhaustive exploration of the aesthetic ideas in all types of Indian texts going far beyond the limited accounts of literary works only : they cover philosophies, laws, purāṇas or histories and particularly *tantras* ; and they deal in all forms of art — painting, sculpture, architecture, literature, music, dance and drama.

In this volume the author deals with the Sanskrit poetics — its problems of aesthetic experience (*rasa*), nature of poetic language and diction (*dhvani* and *alaṅkāra*) revealing the relevant socio-historical and cultural backgrounds. Attempts are there also at giving a definition of beauty in general as found in the texts. Very correctly he directs our attention to the tantric concept of Tripura-sundarī (the most Beautiful Deity of the Three Worlds or three-fold world) for getting the Indian concept of beauty — mystic and monistic in essence but relishable in its playful manifestations through *nāda* (sound) primarily. He points out also different Schools of *Rasa* : Scholastic i.e. from Bharata to Jagannātha etc. and the Neo-Rasa School of the Bengal Vaiṣṇavism in the 15th-16th centuries, and the different views as regards the primary *rasa* — whether the Erotic (*srṅgāra*) or the Pathetic (*karuṇa*) or the Wonder (*adbhūta*) or the Devotion (*bhakti*).

Frankly speaking, the author is widely read and is aware of the entire gamut of the source books in the subject. But what the book lacks greatly and which would have added significantly to the field is a critical insight. By precisising many points which have already been said earlier many times he could have put succinctly his views. The style is more of a summary than of any analysis. Very often he puts the old points only under a new title.

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4. SURESH CHANDRA, *PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS*, PRAKASH BOOK DEPOT, BAREILLY, 1979, 8VO DEMY, PP. XIII+208, PRICE Rs. 50-00.

Chandra collects twenty-three of his papers published in different journals during 1959-74 systematically arranging them in seven suitable sections : (i) Philosophical Scepticism, (ii) Verification and Basic Statements, (iii) Analytic/

synthetic, (iv) Analysis of Experiences, (v) Analysis of the Self, (vi) Discernibility, Entailment, Sense-data and Predication, and (vii) Philosophy and Metaphysics. All the essays are studies in the recent trend of linguistic analysis of Western Philosophy. Authors studied are obviously A. J. Ayer, L. Wittgenstein, G. Ryle, G. E. Moore, Schlick, Russell, Ramsey, Olding, Price, Carnap, Strawson and many others.

The problems handled in the essays are all very interesting and well analysed. Chandra's writing is obviously matured and his thinking remarkably clear. One feels very impressed to notice that he has not exercised with language which appears very often natural in such writings ; he has rather very successfully exercised with the problems and ideas he has handled.

As a critic Chandra is also very bold. We appreciate his boldness, for example, in rejecting the views of a philosopher like Schlick on doubting and verifying the 'experimental statements' or 'confirmations'. Against Schlick's argument that sensory experiences can be doubted and verified Chandra remarks that they can neither be doubted nor verified. Schlick's idea may be justified in case of reports about physical objects such as 'There is an ash-tray on the table'. We can doubt its truth and verify it by touching it. But the reports about psychological phenomena such as 'I feel pain', 'I feel cheerful', can neither be doubted nor verified. To doubt whether one feels pain or not is a question of linguistic ignorance and once one knows what does the word pain denote the doubt is over for all ; it is not a factual doubt, so to say, it is rather a linguistic doubt. Similarly how else one can verify his feeling pain than by only *feeling* pain ?

Almost in all cases the author has exhibited his perceptivity, originality in both enquiry and analysis. The book is very useful for the students of analytic philosophy.

— A. C. Sukla

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5. GEETA UPADHYAYA, *POLITICAL THOUGHT IN SANSKRIT KĀVYA*, CHAUKHAMBHA ORIENTALIA, VARANASI (U.P.) 1979, 8vo DEMY, PAGES 432, PRICE Rs. 75-00.

This is a thesis book containing a descriptive analysis of the political ideas of ancient India as found in the poets from Āśvaghosa to Kāḥaṇa.

The book is divided into three parts, namely, pre-Kālidās, Kālidās and post-Kālidās. The pre-Kālidās section refers to, naturally the ideas of śva Aghosa,



Bhāsa, and the post-Kālidās discusses the ideas Daṇḍin, Bāna Bhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭi, Bhāravi, Māgha, Sūdraka, Viśākhadatta, Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa and Kalhaṇa.

In course of her "excavation", she has found that in the pre-Kālidās era, state-craft was chiselled on the models of Ramayan and Mahavarata whereas in Kālidās's time and after the theory and practice of government took a different turn as ideas relating to aristo-democracy blossomed in the garden of monarchical pattern of society that was India. In Viśākhadatta's days, the system of espionage and diplomacy as an integral part of politics came into lime light.

The book is well structured and systematic with distinct section-division, foot-notes and appendices. The integrated bibliography and subject index also ensures that one is not lost in the wilderness of authors and titles. The preface throws some light upon the compilation and the title is self-explanatory. But in an age of interdisciplinary and comparative researches, the reader expects to see the author's perspectives of the values of political ideas of ancient India set against the modern political intellections. Devoid of this important part, the book is reduced to a textual summary of the "thoughts" that the present author has handled.

— Suresh Chandra Mishra

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6. SATYASWARUPA MISRA, *THE AVESTAN : A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR*, CHAUKHAMBHA ORIENTALIA, VARANASI, 1979, 8vo DEMY, HARDBOUND, PP XVIII+284 : PRICE Rs. 60-00.

The book gives an account of the history and development of the Avestan language, and relates it to other Indo-European languages at various linguistic levels. Avestan, spoken in ancient Persia, was a branch of Iranian languages which in their turn belonged to the Indo-European group of languages. It was the language used in *Zend Avesta*, the holy book of the Zoroastrians. There were the Gothic and the younger varieties of this language which later developed into the modern Pastho. The introductory chapter succinctly presents a picture of the Indo-European language family and the place occupied in it by Avestan. However, a diagram would have been great help here.

The next three chapters give an exhaustive treatment of the Avestan vowels along with their variants in different situations. They also discuss features such as epenthesis, prothesis, anaptyxis and the like. The author first takes up the Indo-European vowels, and then settles down to a detailed analysis of the Avestan vowels, Chapter V through XI (excluding Chapter IX which deals

with semi-vowels) give an equally comprehensive description of the consonants. The author has brought to this study his considerable erudition in Sanskrit, Greek, Old Persian and other Indo-European languages.

The study of Avestan morphology is as exhaustive as the treatment of phonology. The next three chapters deal with case-endings and declensions of various types of stems relating to the vowel, liquid, nasal, spirant and plosive sounds. The rest of the book follows the same pattern ; it postulates a historical relationship among the different languages in their diverse areas. The book concludes with a table showing the Avestan script along with the Roman transcription.

The book is no doubt a painstaking work. However, it reads more like a catalogue of words and morphemes than like a coherent, meaningful account. The author recommends it as a text-book, and if it were to be used as such, it might be at times tedious to the student. The book is not free from ungrammatical expressions such as the following : "quite a many" (p.9), History of Avestan vowels has been..." (p.29), "normal to" (p.46), "Accordingly there were four..." (p.86), "the reconstruction of laryngeals have been..." (p.87). Latin expressions like etc. and *vide* should perhaps have been done away with in favour of the English forms. These apart, the book is full of printing errors. Despite these lapses, the book may still be useful to the students of historico-comparative grammar.

— J. K. Chand

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7. KARABI SEN, *THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY*, SANSKRIT PUSTAK BHANDAR, CALCUTTA, 8VO DEMY, PP. 89, Rs. 30-00.

The book under review has been divided into three sections : metaphysics, scientific philosophy and ethics and social political philosophy. In the first section the author explores the nature of problems and that of experience. The second section spells out the basis and method of a scientific philosophy of man. The three chapters of the third section deal with less abstract issues like the relation between individual issues like relation between individual and society and role of woman in establishing international unity and problems of justice. While the first two sections reveal a unity of design and purpose, the east section seems to be out of tune with the rest of the book. It fails to bear out the claim made in the preface that they are marked by great realism, human love, sympathy and

compassion. They merely offer some hackneyed illustration and moral and metaphysical common places.

In the first two sections, however, a sincere attempt has been made to integrate science with philosophy. At the beginning, the author systematically refutes the contention of logical positivists who claim that philosophy, has no real problem at hand. For this, she takes the help of evolutionary evidence and persuasively argues for the centrality in human consciousness a basic drive towards survival. Philosophy cannot confine itself to semantic analysis ignoring problems which originate in the needs of the living creature and arise out of the encounter of the living being with his environment which is what constitutes experience. (p.18) Her analysis of different theories of experience is again enriched by competent handling of scientific evidence.

In the chapters that follow the author emphasises the unity of all knowledge and proposes a stimulating definition of what she calls a scientific philosophy of man. A scientific philosophy of man, she says aims at a philosophical appraisal of the human situation in the light of the researches being made in the sciences of man. What is more important, she also suggests a tentative method for this new philosophy of man. The ideal method in her opinion, for a scientific philosophy of man would be a scientific one with an enlarged "testability criterion".

The attempt of Dr. Sen supplements similar attempts by some scientists with a different emphasis. Bentley Glass, in his *Science and Ethical Values*, seeks to give science a sound metaphysical and ethical basis and describes it as an ethical, and subjective activity. Such efforts to integrate science and philosophy are particularly welcome at a time when the influence of liberal studies is fast declining.

— Jatindra K. Nayak

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8. SEN AND BOSE, *INFLUENCES ON HINDU CIVILIZATION BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM*, SANSKRIT PUSTAK BHANDAR, 1979, CALCUTTA, PP.73, Rs. 10-00.

This book is of special interest because of its dispassionate examination of the past at a time of strident Hindu nationalism. It has been rightly called an 'offbeat discovery of history' in the introduction.

This slim volume consists of two essays written in the last decades of the 19th century. They propose to examine the nature of Buddhist and Muslim influences on the Hindu society. The first essay which tries to show 'how the Hindus and Buddhists lived together between the 8th and 11th century of the Christian era',

makes use of purely literary evidence. But even within such limitations it is able to offer very interesting as well as useful insights into the state of society in which interaction between the Buddhists and the Hindus took place. Such insights are the product of a very sensitive and intelligent scrutiny of Sanskrit plays like *Malatī Madhav* and *Mrichhakatikam*. With remarkable objectivity, the author notes that pejorative references to Buddhists could be the products of Brahmin hostility.

The second essay is yet another example of secular historiography. Here, however, the sources are not purely literary. The authors seek to analyse the causes of the decay of the Hindu society and the ascendancy of Muslim power. They point out the weakness inherent in a cast-ridden society where knowledge was monopolized by the Brahmins and the broad masses were alienated from the elites. The egalitarian world-view of Islam was certainly a challenge to the Hindu society which institutionalised inequality. The authors describe the *Bhakti* and other reformist movements within the fold of Hinduism itself as responses to this challenge. Their nationalist outlook, however, becomes obvious in their account of Indian society under Muslim rule. They demonstrate that in this society conditions of living were comfortable and Hindus and Muslims lived without racial tension.

As points of departure from the dominant historiography of the 19th century, these two essays anticipate, in many ways, modern historical understanding.

— Jatindra K. Nayak

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9. HIRALAL SHUKLA, *WORD ATLAS OF BAGHEL-KHANDA*, ARCHANA PRAKASHAN, ALLAHABAD, PP. 1-50+400 MAPS, Rs. 1500-00.

Word geography is an important aspect of modern linguistic studies. Western linguists have prepared the word atlas of most of the languages in Europe and America. But this kind of study has not received much attention of the linguists in India. In this respect the work of Professor Hiralal Shukla is very significant. His *WORD ATLAS OF BAGHEL-KHANDA* is the first atlas in Indian Linguistics. It has been provided with two hundred items carefully selected out of the collection from two hundred informants who belong to the different areas of M.P., U.P. and Maharastra.

Phonological, syntactic and semantic data collected from the informants are beautifully presented through 400 multi-coloured maps in the word atlas

with an introduction of 50 pages in Hindi. Each map has been provided with a note of introduction and description. Out of the 400 maps (size 18" x 11½") the first 25 are introductory in nature. The next 350 contain the data collected. Next 4 maps show the bundling of isoglossic lines, and the last 21 maps represent the correlation between the previous lines, presenting a clear picture of the sub-dialect areas of Baghelkhand.

The word atlas outlines the problem of Indian dialect studies and is useful in tracing the interpretation of the dialects. Being a work of great scholarship it will be a guide in the solution of the historical problems in Indian Linguistics.

— Bijay K. Tripathy

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10. BIJAN BISWAS, *MAIN PROBLEMS OF KANT'S CRITIQUE : A CRITICAL SURVEY*, SANSKRIT PUSTAK BHANDAR, CALCUTTA, 1979, 8VO DEMY PPVI+88, Rs. 30.00.

Immanuel Kant is the most revolutionary thinker in the history of modern philosophy. In his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant investigates the power of pure reason. Denouncing his rationalist predecessors as dogmatists since they had uncritically assumed that Pure Reason could give us knowledge independent of experience, for the first time Kant brings Reason before a tribunal, subjects it to critical scrutiny and fixes its jurisdiction. Such an undertaking results in the denial of speculative metaphysics. But Kant's rejection of metaphysics is neither absolute nor unqualified. He accepts two forms of Scientific metaphysics such as — (i) Metaphysics of Nature (ii) Metaphysics of Morals. The present author is justified in his observation that "Kant is not only the destroyer of metaphysics but also the contructor of another type of metaphysics".

According to commentators like H. I. Paton and W. K. Smith Kant's revolution in philosophy may be called Copernican Revolution. The author emphasises this point towards the end of the 1st chapter. Just as Copernicus' 'Heliocentric' theory is the complete reversal of the 'Geocentric' theory of Ptolemy similarly Kant rejects the widely accepted Pre-Kantian view that knowledge conforms to objects and says that objects conform to knowledge. The objects must conform to the conditions laid down by the mind to be objects of human knowledge. Reason must approach nature not as a pupil but as a judge. In this context the author refers to the objection raised by Somuel Alexander that

that Kant's revolution cannot be called copernican. Arguments and counter arguments of critics are inserted appropriately.

A very welcome feature of this present volume is the author's attempt to defend Kant against his critics who point out that his distinction between the analytic and the synthetic proposition is inadequate because it is applicable only to subject predicate type of judgement whereas modern logicians say that all judgments are not of this form such as existential propositions and class-membership propositions. The author has tried to meet this objections through a slight modification of Kantian definition.

Compliments are due to the author for this work with a hope that it will awaken a desire of the readers for further researches in the subject.

— Sarat Chandra Mohapatra

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11. SUDARSHAN KUMARI, *ASPIRATIONS OF INDIAN YOUTH: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY OF YOUTH*, CHAUKHAMBHA ORIENTALIA, VARANASI, 1978, 8VO DEMY, PP XIX+282, PRICE RS. 65-00.

The book under review is based on the study of 240 students and 160 non-student youths equally representing rural as well as urban areas of four districts of Uttar Pradesh — Meerut, Kanpur, Varanasi and Jhansi — covering four different socio-cultural regions excluding Hill areas. Apart from these youths, some youth leaders, youth workers, social leaders and educationists were also contacted to supplement the data by their views.

The study deals mainly with the analysis of the aspirations of youth related to life, education, income, wealth, occupation, social status, marriage, family, politics, society and nation. Attempt has also been made in it to highlight the social handicaps in the realisation of these aspirations.

Generally high education, intellectual attainments, moral and religious virtues, service of society and nation are considered to be essentials expected of youngmen. But the study reveals that the oft proclaimed idealism of youth was not evident in most cases. Many youths seem to be either having no ideals or concerned mainly with immediate problems of life, and only a few had some perception of the intrinsic values of life. The study also indicates that among the youths, aspiration for education, wealth and occupation is rising fastly and aspiration for small family, political power and higher social status is also

increasing constantly. Freedom from the bonds of parents, family and caste system is also gaining ground among the youths.

The exposition of the problems and difficulties of the youths, made by the author, through the analysis of their aspirations has made this book an important reference for the students and research scholars of sociology and social psychology interested in understanding the psychology of the youths and their problems. Others interested in youth problems may also be benefited.

— S. L. Srivastava